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DISENFRANCHISE THIS: STATE VOTER ID
LAWS AND THEIR DISCONTENTS, A
BLUEPRINT FOR BRINGING SUCCESSFUL
EQUAL PROTECTION AND POLL TAX CLAIMS
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the passage of the Help America Vote Act in 2002,1 nearly half
of the states have enacted some form of an identification requirement as
a prerequisite to in-person voting.2 Proponents argue that such laws are
necessary to combat alleged voter fraud.3 While the actual scope of voter
fraud, particularly in-person voter fraud, is widely disputed, state voter
identification laws are becoming increasingly prevalent.4 In fact,

Help America Vote Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 15401-15406 (Supp. IV 2000) [hereinafter HAVA].
“The first focused effort by Congress to regulate the actual mechanisms by which elections
are administered, HAVA set forth comprehensive requirements designed ‘to assist in the
administration of Federal elections and . . . to establish minimum election administration
standards for States and units of local government.’” Developments in the Law-Voting and
Democracy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1127, 1148 (2006) [hereinafter Voter Identification Laws].
2
As of August 1, 2006, twenty-four states required voters to show identification prior to
voting, seven of which required photo identification. See National Conference of State
Legislatures, State Requirements for Voter ID, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legismgt/
elect/taskfc/VoterIDReq.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2007) [hereinafter National Conference of
State Legislatures]. While seven states currently request photo identification, most allow
alternatives. See David H. Harris Jr., Georgia Photo ID Requirement: Proof Positive of the Need
to Extend Section 5, 28 N.C. CENT. L.J. 172, 182 (2006) [hereinafter Proof Positive] (listing
examples of alternatives); see also Ariel Hart, Georgia Voters May Soon Need Photo IDs, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 1, 2005, at A15 [hereinafter Hart I] (comparing photo ID requirements in
different states). However, as of August 1, 2006, four states had strictly mandated that only
government-issued photo IDs will be accepted for in-person voting. See National Conference
of State Legislatures supra.
3
See Voter Identification Laws, supra note 1, at 1146 n.4. Drawing mostly on anecdotal
evidence, state legislators complain of inflated voter rolls, purchased votes, and ballots cast
by illegal immigrants, felons, and the deceased. See American Center for Voting Rights,
Vote Fraud, Intimidation & Suppression in the 2004 Presidential Election, http://www.ac4vr.
com/reports/072005/default.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2006) (detailing findings of alleged
voter fraud in several states); see also Voter Identification Laws, supra note 1, at 1145
(describing “bloated” voter rolls, containing the names of felons and the deceased).
4
See Voter Identification Laws, supra note 1, at 1152-53 (describing how reports can
overstate the extent of voter fraud and the actual effect it has on elections). Thus far, in
cases involving voter ID laws in Indiana, Georgia, and Missouri, the courts have all noted
the lack of evidence documenting in-person voter fraud in those states. See Common
Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1361, 1366 (N.D. Ga. 2005) [hereinafter
Common Cause I]; Common Cause/Georigia v. Billups, 439 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1350 (N.D. Ga.
2006) [hereinafter Common Cause II]; Indiana Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d
775, 792-93, 826 (S.D. Ind. 2006); Weinschenk v. Mo., 203 S.W.3d 201, 217 (Mo. 2006).
1
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Congress recently took a cue from the states and began considering a
national voter identification requirement as well.5
Creating the greatest controversy are a few states that have passed
statutes requiring every in-person voter to show a government-issued
photo ID before casting a ballot.6 Because these extra-stringent laws
have the potential to disenfranchise registered voters lacking proper
identification, they have provoked heated partisan debate, spurring a
flurry of litigation.7 In particular, the disproportionate impact that these
5
Federal Election Integrity Act, H.R. 4844, 109th Cong. (2006) (this Act is not listed in
the Code and did not appear in the House Bill Status report which might suggest that it
was not passed). In September of 2006, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the
Federal Election Integrity Act, modeled after State voter ID laws to require proof of
citizenship and photo ID to vote in the 2008 election. The Act passed the House of
Representatives by a vote of 228 to 195. See Marc H. Morial, National Voter ID Legislation
Poses Direct Threat to Right to Vote, 101 CHI. DEFENDER 87, Oct. 4. 2006. Some perceived the
bill as merely election year politics, but several Senators were greatly alarmed by the
sweeping bill and asked that it not be brought to vote in the Senate. See Senate Democrats
Decry Modern-Day Poll Tax, U.S. FED. NEWS, Sept. 22, 2006; Democratic Members of the Senate
and House of Representatives Hold a News Conference on the Voter ID Requirement Bill, FDCH
CAPITAL TRANSCRIPTS, Sept. 27, 2006; Adam Cohen, American Elections and the Grand Old
Tradition of Disenfranchisement, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2006, at § 4 (claiming that the proposed
bill undermines American democracy). See also Morial supra (stating “Americans are as
likely to commit election fraud as they are getting killed by lightening. Since October of
2002, a total of 86 U.S. residents have been convicted of federal election fraud, while nearly
197,000,000 ballots have been cast in general elections.”). Specifically, members of
Congress concerned with the proposed law characterized it as a poll tax which would
unnecessarily disenfranchise millions of American voters. See This Poll Tax Isn’t Welcome,
BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 8, 2006, at E8:
Two days after the House vote, a report by the widely respected
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities showed that some 11 million
citizens don’t have a birth certificate or a passport in their home. The
elderly are far more likely to lack such documents than the nonelderly;
low-income residents were nearly twice as likely not to have them. The
script almost starts to write itself: About 2 million black and 4.5 million
rural residents also lack the required documents, according to the
report. No matter how you slice it, the numbers amount to a serious
dismantling of voting rights.
Id.
6
These extra-stringent laws are the subject of this Note. At the time of this writing,
Georgia, Indiana, Missouri, Arizona, South Dakota, and Ohio had passed voter ID statutes
with this extra-stringent requirement. See National Conference of State Legislatures, supra note
2.
7
See infra Part II (describing partisan passage of voter ID laws, the potential for such
laws to disenfranchise some voters, and subsequent litigation); see also Voter Identification
Laws, supra note 1, at 1146 (introducing the argument that the democratic process is better
served by encouraging broad participation in the electoral process and limiting voting
restrictions which have the potential to discourage or disrupt voting). But see IDs and Voter
Confidence Political Parties are Bitterly Divided on an Issue it Behooves Them to Work Together
On, FORT WAYNE NEWS SENTINEL, Oct. 19, 2006, at A6:
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laws may have on the indigent, elderly, disabled, and minority voters
raises great concern regarding the constitutionality and morality of such
laws.8
Using the extra-stringent voter ID statutes of Indiana, Georgia, and
Missouri as case studies, Part II of this Note will provide a factual
background, discussing the legislative history, concerns of
disenfranchisement, and subsequent judicial treatment of each law.9
Focusing specifically on Equal Protection and poll tax challenges, Part III
of this Note will undertake a more detailed analysis of the case law by
distinguishing factors that contribute to successful claims.10 Finally, Part
IV of this Note will offer a blueprint for successful challenges against
state voter ID laws, synthesizing trends gleaned from the cases decided
thus far.11
II. BACKGROUND
Before undertaking a detailed legal analysis of state voter ID laws, it
is important to appreciate that the requirements and issues they create
are relatively novel and judicially untested.12 While most states have
long required some form of identification to vote, the absolute
requirement to show a government-issued photo ID, exclusive of all
It seems clear that Republicans are not just interested in fraud. The
most likely kinds of fraud - people who vote in two states, for example,
or cheat on absentee ballots - are not addressed by photo IDs. But it’s
also obvious that Democrats are not just interested in protecting the
rights of the downtrodden. This is about each side getting as many
votes as it can in a bitter political culture and at a time when big
elections can be decided in a handful of precincts. In the process of
waging this war, the two parties are making weary, suspicious voters
have even less faith in the system.
Id.
8
Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1365-66 (N.D. Ga. 2005)
(“Common Cause I”):
Unfortunately, the Photo ID requirement is most likely to prevent
Georgia’s elderly, poor, and African-American voters from voting. For
those citizens, the character and magnitude of their injury—the loss of
their right to vote—is undeniably demoralizing and extreme, as those
citizens are likely to have no other realistic or effective means of
protecting their rights.
Id.
9
See generally infra Part II.
10
See generally infra Part III.
11
See generally infra Part IV.
12
In 2005, Indiana was the first state to mandate a government issued photo ID to vote.
See infra notes 47-57 (discussing promulgation of the first voter ID statute only a few years
ago).
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other forms of identification, is new.13 The creation and subsequent
adjudication of state voter ID requirements represent a prime example of
developing law, evidencing both the laboratory of the states and the
crucible of the courtroom.14 The state voter ID laws, thus far enacted,
have been markedly similar in both creation and effect, raising the same
political, social, and legal concerns through nearly identical
requirements.15 The developing judicial treatment of the statutes has
been more fluid, however, with courts taking different approaches of
analysis and producing divergent outcomes.16
Given the newness of this rapidly developing area of law, this Note
takes a conservative approach in order to establish more reliable
conclusions regarding the anticipated direction of the developing law.17
Part II.A begins by providing a brief overview of relevant election law
precedent.18 Next, Part II.B consecutively introduces the enactment and
subsequent judicial treatment of three current voter ID statutes.19 In
doing so, Part II also highlights the similar requirements, legislative
history, and concerns raised by all three laws.20 Additionally, Part II
discusses the distinct judicial treatment that each law has encountered, in
regard to Equal Protection and poll tax challenges.21 The sharply
divergent judicial outcomes spawning from nearly identical statutes lay
the foundation for subsequent legal analysis in Part III.22
A. Brief Overview of Federal Election Law Under Equal Protection and Poll
Tax Precedent
In order to best understand the legal challenges raised as a result of
the recently enacted state voter ID laws, a basic understanding of the
For example, prior to adoption of its stringent voter ID law, Georgia permitted eight
forms of identification to vote, including a birth certificate, a social security card, a copy of
a current utility bill, a government check, a payroll check, or a bank statement with the
voter’s name and address. See Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1331.
14
See generally infra Part II and Part III. The structure of this Note is that of a comparison
and contrast of the similar requirements and divergent judicial treatment of the initial state
voter ID statutes.
15
See generally infra notes 47-57, 77-85, 120-26 (introducing the similarities in
development and requirement of the earliest voter ID laws).
16
See generally infra notes 58-76, 86-119, 127-136 (discussing the divergent judicial
treatment of the earliest voter ID laws).
17
See generally infra Part II and Part III.
18
See generally infra Part II.A.
19
See generally infra Part II.B.
20
See supra note 15.
21
See supra note 16.
22
See generally infra Part III.
13
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legal tests used to analyze them is necessary.23 Part II.A.1 introduces the
legal tests used for Equal Protection challenges, and Part II.A.2
introduces the tests under the Twenty-Fourth Amendment’s prohibition
of Poll Tax laws.24
1.

Challenges under Equal Protection:
Undue Burden

Election Laws Imposing an

The right to vote is a fundamental right - arguably, the most
important fundamental right.25 Voting is the way citizens impact the
legislative process in a representative democracy.26 Indeed, voting is
“preservative of other basic civil and political rights” and demands extra
judicial protection.27 The right to vote, however, is not absolute.28
Instead, the states have some authority to impose voter qualifications
and regulate elections.29 For instance, the United States Constitution
grants the states the ability to establish time, place, and manner
regulations on federal elections.30 This power is limited, however, as
state voting regulations may not unduly burden or abridge the right to
vote.31
When a state-imposed election regulation has the potential to
disenfranchise some voters, the regulation may be challenged on
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection grounds.32 Courts considering

This section borrows heavily, in both structure and substance, from the legal
standards laid out in Common Cause I. See generally Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1326,
1359-61, 1366-68 (N.D. Ga. 2005). Because this section attempts only to present a basic
overview of current election law precedent, particularly in regards to Equal Protection and
poll tax challenges, the concise explanations in the Common Cause I decision were used
without much deviation. After introducing the legal frameworks used to analyze election
law challenges, this Note proceeds in a more detailed description of how recent cases have
employed these methods to analyze state voter ID laws.
24
See generally infra Part II.A and accompanying text. These tests will be referenced
frequently in subsequent sections when discussing the legal analysis of state voter ID laws.
25
See Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1359 (citing Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428,
433 (1992)).
26
See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964) (“No right is more precious in a free
country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under
which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the
right to vote is undermined.”).
27
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
28
See Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1359 (citing Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330,
336 (1972)).
29
Id.
30
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
31
See Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 217 (1986).
32
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
23
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such challenges have traditionally applied the strict scrutiny analysis,
requiring that the regulation employ narrowly tailored means to
accomplish a compelling regulatory interest.33 In more recent cases,
however, courts have not automatically applied strict scrutiny analysis to
all regulations impacting the right to vote, but instead apply the more
flexible Burdick test.34 Under the Burdick test, a court must balance the
“character and magnitude” of the harm imposed on the right to vote
against the state’s reason for enacting the regulation and the necessity of
the regulation.35 When using the Burdick test, courts possess discretion
to utilize either strict scrutiny or a standard similar to rational basis to
review the challenged regulation, depending on how “severe” the court
determines the imposed harm to be.36 If the court determines that the
right to vote is severely harmed by a state regulation, the court will
proceed under strict scrutiny analysis.37
However, if the court
determines that the right to vote is not severely harmed, it will proceed
under a rational basis-like review, requiring only that the regulation be
reasonable to advance an important regulatory interest.38
2.

Challenges under the Twenty-Fourth Amendment: Election Laws
Imposing a Cost

A second constitutional challenge, common in every decision thus
far decided, are allegations that state voter ID laws impose a material
requirement on the right to vote, in violation of the Twenty-Fourth
Amendment.39 The Twenty-Fourth Amendment provides: “The right of
citizens of the United States to vote . . . shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax
or other tax.”40 A poll tax has been defined as the imposition of any
See, eg., Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1361-62. For purposes of simplification,
this will be hereinafter referred to as “outright strict scrutiny analysis.”
34
See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433-34 (1992).
35
See Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1360 (citing Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428,
433 (1992)).
36
Id.; see also infra note 38 and accompanying text (briefly discussing the elements of
rational basis review).
37
See, e.g., Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1360. For purposes of simplification, this
will be hereinafter referred to as “strict scrutiny analysis under the Burdick test.”
38
Id. For purposes of simplification, this will be hereinafter referred to as “rational basis
analysis under the Burdick test.”
39
See infra notes 69-74, 101-05, 113-16, 130-33 and accompanying text (discussing poll tax
challenges to voter ID laws in Indiana, Georgia, and Missouri).
40
U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV. Poll tax laws have historically been used to discourage
unwanted voters from participating in federal elections by imposing material requirements
on the right to vote. See generally Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1367-68 (citing
examples of unconstitutional poll taxes).
33
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material requirement on the voting process in order to discourage voting
or to deflect the administrative costs of an election.41 The requirement
need not be monetary or of high value to run afoul of the prohibition, so
long as the requirement is a “material” hurdle that the voter must
overcome before exercising her right.42 The most common way a poll tax
is imposed is through a direct or primary cost on the right to vote, such
as a voting “fee.” However, courts have considered the imposition of
poll taxes through incidental or secondary costs as well.43 Secondary
costs are not directly imposed by the challenged regulation, instead, they
are often imposed as a result of overlapping regulations.44 Whether the
challenge is against primary or secondary costs, it is within the court’s
discretion to determine whether a regulation imposes an impermissible
material requirement on the right to vote or merely imposes a
permissible and tangential burden.45
B. Factual Background and Subsequent Judicial Treatment of Three State
Voter ID Laws
This section will simultaneously introduce the enacted voter ID
statutes, highlighting their similar history and purpose and noting their
disputed constitutionality.46
1.

Indiana

On July 1, 2005, amidst heavy partisan disagreement, Indiana
became the first state to require a government-issued picture ID (“photo
ID”) as an absolute condition for in-person voting.47 The Indiana law
mandated that all in-person voters present a photo ID card before casting

41
See generally Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1367-69; Indiana Democratic Party v.
Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 826-27 (S.D. Ind. 2006).
42
Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1367-69.
43
Claims against secondary costs are more common in cases involving state voter ID
laws. See, e.g., Common Cause II, 439 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1354-55 (N.D. Ga. 2005); Rokita, 458 F.
Supp. 2d at 827.
44
See, e.g., Weinschenk v. Mo, 203 S.W.3d 201, 207-08 (discussing the overlapping
requirements of Missouri’s voter ID law and the federal REAL ID Act).
45
See generally Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1367-69; Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 82627.
46
See generally infra Part II.B.
47
IND. CODE §§ 3-5-2-40.5; 3-10-1-7.2; 3-10-8-25 (2006). Prior to enactment of the new
law, Indiana did not require any form of identification at the polls, relying instead on
signature comparisons, voter challenges, and criminal penalties to catch and deter inperson voter fraud. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 788; see also id. at 783 (stating that “[t]his
litigation is the result of a partisan legislative disagreement that has spilled out of the state
house into the courts.”).
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a ballot.48 According to the provisions of the statute, the state was
required to issue free photo IDs to all registered voters who are at least
eighteen years old and who lack a valid driver’s license.49 Similar to
voter ID statutes in other states, the proffered legislative purpose for
enacting Indiana’s law was preventing voter fraud.50 However, at the
time of its passage, there was no evidence of in-person voter fraud in
Indiana.51 Instead, the state justified its actions as a means of combating
potential in-person fraud, as well as decreasing voter perception of
fraud.52
When Indiana adopted its voter ID law, the number of registered
Indiana voters who lacked a requisite government-issued photo ID was
in dispute.53 Nevertheless, it was predicted by opponents that the new
law would decrease voter turnout among minorities, the disabled, and
48
Voters without the requisite card are permitted to cast a provisional ballot on the day
of an election, conditioned on the voter presenting acceptable photo identification to the
circuit court clerk or to the county election board within ten days after the election. IND.
CODE §§ 3-11-8-25.1(e), 3-11-7.5-2.5(a) (2006). Further, the law permits voters without photo
identification due to indigence to cast a provisional ballot, conditioned on the voter
returning to the clerk’s office within ten days to sign a poverty affidavit. IND. CODE § 311.7-5-1 (2006). Additionally, the stringent requirements of the new law are not applicable
to absentee voting or to votes cast from state licensed care facilities. IND. CODE §§ 3-10-17.2(e), 3-11-8-10-1.2 (2006).
49
IND. CODE § 9-24-16-10 (2006).
50
Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 825, 826.
51
The Rokita court noted plaintiffs’ evidence that no Indiana voter has ever been charged
with attempted in-person voter fraud and that evidence of such fraud was not presented
during enactment of Indiana’s voter ID law. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 792-93. But see
Crawford v. Marion County Elec. Bd., 472 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2007) (Judge Posner argued
that the lack of proven in-person fraud was due to difficulty detecting in-person fraud
rather than proof that it didn’t actually occur in Indiana). The court also noted that the
defendants’ conceded that the state is unaware of any evidence of in-person voter fraud in
Indiana. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 792-93. However, when the law was passed, there was
evidence of absentee voter fraud and inflated voter rolls; voting areas which were left
untouched by the new voter ID statute. See Pabey v. Pastrick, 816 N.E.2d 1138 (Ind. 2004)
(Indiana Supreme Court vacated the results of East Chicago’s mayoral election due to
pervasive absentee voter fraud). See also Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 793 (discussing the
“Benson Report,” estimating Indiana’s voter inflation are among the highest in the
country); Niki Kelly, Parties Bicker over Voter Lists Disagree on How to Fix Inaccuracies, THE J.
GAZETTE, June 15, 2006, at 1C; Niki Kelly, Bipartisan Plan Seeks Cleaned-up VoterRolls, THE J.
GAZETTE, June 24, 2006, at 3C [hereinafter Bipartisan Plan].
52
The state presented evidence of in-person voting fraud in other states. Rokita, 458 F.
Supp. 2d at 793-94. The state also argued that “perception” of fraud impacted voter
confidence in the election system. Id. at 794.
53
The Rokita court concluded that the Brace Report submitted by the plaintiffs for the
purposes of estimating the scope of potential disenfranchisement was “utterly incredible
and unreliable.” Id. at 803. The Brace Report estimated that potentially 989,000 registered
Indiana voters lacked photo identification. Id.
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the elderly.54 In particular, the time and financial burdens incidental to
obtaining a birth certificate, a necessary prerequisite for obtaining an
Indiana voter ID, concerned those serving vulnerable populations.55
Chiefly, opponents argued that the often difficult and frustrating process
of obtaining a birth certificate might cause some eligible voters to forgo
voting.56 However, proponents of the law saw these concerns as
unwarranted, especially because the Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles
successfully issued more than 82,000 voter IDs in the year between the
law’s adoption and the federal mid-term elections in November 2006.57
a.

Indiana Democratic Party v. Rokita

In the spring of 2005, Indiana’s voter ID law was challenged in
federal court on state and federal constitutional claims.58 Before
beginning its analysis, the Rokita court extensively considered the factual
background of Indiana’s voter ID law.59 The court acknowledged the
lack of evidence of in-person voter fraud in Indiana and noted the

The Rokita court discussed a report by Professor Marjorie Hershey of Indiana
University [hereinafter Hershey Report] which concluded that the time, transportation, and
fees needed to obtain the necessary documentation, “threaten[ed] to be most difficult for
the disabled, homeless, persons with limited income, those without cars, people of color,
those who are part of ‘language minorities,’ and the elderly.” Id. at 795 (internal quotations
omitted). The Rokita court also noted depositions and reports that were submitted to warn
of potential disenfranchisement of disabled, homeless, and elderly voters in Indiana. Id. at
795-96. These concerns were magnified by the decreasing availability of BMV branches in
Indiana and a lack of proposed voter education. See id. at 792 (noting closure of several
BMV branches in Indiana, increasing travel costs for some Indiana voters); see also
Bipartisan Plan supra note 51 (discussing proposed voter education).
55
Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 791-92.
56
The Rokita court noted affidavits of registered voters who had difficulty obtaining
birth certificates. Id. at 791 n.18 (citing Affidavits of Mary Anderson and Theresa
Clemente). The Indiana Department of Health is legally required to charge ten dollars to
conduct a birth-certificate search. Id. (citing IND. CODE §§ 16-37-1-11; 16-37-1-11.5 (2006)).
The cost of such searches at local health departments ranges between two and ten dollars.
Id. For individuals born in other states, the cost for obtaining a birth certificate can be
much more expensive and take even more time. Id.
57
Indiana BMV Expects Fewer Voter Problems, EVANSVILLE COURIER PRESS, Oct. 10, 2006, at
B7.
58
Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 775. The plaintiffs’ federal constitutional claims included
arguments that the law substantially burdened the fundamental right to vote,
impermissibly discriminated between different classes of voters, disproportionately
affected disadvantaged voters, was unconstitutionally vague, imposed a new and material
requirement for voting, and was not justified by existing circumstances or evidence. Id. at
783-84. The court criticized the plaintiffs for utilizing a “haphazard, ‘shot gun’ approach”
in raising these issues and faulted the plaintiffs for not substantiating their claims with
actual proof of harm or legal precedent. Id. at 784 n.6.
59
See generally id. at 784-809.
54
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potential for the photo ID requirement to disenfranchise Indiana voters.60
The court additionally noted, however, evidence of in-person fraud in
other states exposes a direct correlation between the perception of fraud
and voter confidence in the election system.61
Significant in the court’s review of the record, however, was
criticism of the lack of reliable evidence submitted to prove voter
disenfranchisement.62 In particular, the court faulted the plaintiffs for
not submitting affidavits of individual voters who lacked a governmentissued photo ID and who would be prevented or discouraged from
voting as a result of the law.63 Similarly, the Rokita court entirely
dismissed a report, submitted by the plaintiffs to estimate the number of
Indiana voters without a photo ID, as “utterly incredible and unreliable,”
effectively eliminating all of the evidentiary support for the plaintiffs’
claim of voter disenfranchisement.64 The Rokita court’s conclusions
60
The court noted that both parties stipulated that there was no evidence of in-person
voter fraud in Indiana. Id. at 792-93. The court also acknowledged expert conclusions that
Indiana’s voter ID law would negatively impact voters from lower socio-economic
backgrounds, particularly the homeless, senior citizens, people with disabilities, the poor,
and minorities. Id. at 795 (citing conclusions of the Hershey Report).
61
Id. at 793-94. The court rejected the plaintiffs’ attempt to exclude this evidence by
claiming that the data was unsworn, unauthenticated, contained hearsay, and was not
relied on by the Indiana legislature in passing the statute. Id. at 843-44. The Rokita court’s
argument that the state did not have to empirically justify its purpose seems influenced by
the court’s decision to use rational basis review, highly deferential to legislative judgments.
Id. The Rokita court expressed that a court should defer to legislative judgments, balancing
prevention of voter fraud versus encouragement of voter turnout, unless such judgments
are “grossly awry.” Id. at 825. In contrast, the Weinschenk court, analyzing Missouri’s voter
ID statute under strict scrutiny, held that empirical justifications were necessary and that
mere perception of fraud was insufficient justification for enacting a law which impacted a
fundamental right. Weinschenk v. Mo., 203 S.W.3d 201, 218 (Mo. 2006).
62
Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 822-24.
63
Id. at 819 (dismissing the “Organizational Plaintiffs” on standing grounds). The court
stated, that “[t]he only information provided to the court are the unsubstantiated hearsay
statements alleging that unnamed individuals will be burdened by SEA 483; such
statements are totally lacking in fending off summary judgment.” Id. Specifically, the
court faulted the plaintiffs for “fail[ing] to produce any evidence of any individual,
registered or unregistered, who would have to obtain photo identification in order to
vote. . . .” Id. at 822-23; see also Crawford v. Marion County Elec. Bd., 472 F.3d 949 (7th Cir.
2007) (affirming the Rokita decision for the same reason).
64
Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 803. The Brace Report was a statistical report which
estimated the extent of potential voter disenfranchisement caused by Indiana’s voter ID
law. See generally id. at 803-09. It was created by comparing the number of registered
voters on the state voter roll with the number of residents with a state-issued ID, as
indicated by state licensing records. Id. The court held that this report carried no
evidentiary weight given its failure to comport with the standards propounded in the Rule
702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Id. at 803. In particular, the Rokita court faulted the
Brace Report for (1) failing to account for voter roll inflation, (2) comparing demographic
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regarding the lack of evidence submitted to prove voter
disenfranchisement was influential in the court’s subsequent legal
analysis.65
Because of the claimed evidentiary inadequacies, the Rokita court
quickly determined that the harm imposed by Indiana’s voter ID law
was not severe and did not warrant traditional strict scrutiny review.66
Proceeding under the Burdick test and using rational basis review, the
court concluded that the requirements of Indiana’s voter ID law were
reasonable to advance the state’s important regulatory interest in
preventing voter fraud.67 Defending its position, the Rokita court held
that the state did not have to show actual proof of in-person fraud to
justify its voter ID law and could rely instead on evidence of voter fraud
in other states and the impact of perception of voter fraud in Indiana.68
Next, considering the claim that Indiana’s voter ID statute
constituted a poll tax, the Rokita court quickly concluded that the law did
not impose any impermissible costs on the right to vote.69 The court
noted that the Indiana statute required that the IDs be issued without

data from different years without qualification or analysis, (3) drawing inaccurate and
illogical conclusions, and (4) failing to qualify the statistical estimates based on
socioeconomic data. See generally id. at 803-07. The Rokita court’s outright rejection of the
Brace Report is somewhat confusing however, given the court’s subsequent use of
statistical conclusions in the Brace Report to indirectly support the defendants’ counterarguments. See, eg., id. at 806-07 (citing Brace Report statistics suggesting that 99% of
Indiana voters already have a photo ID).
65
See infra notes 66-68 and accompanying text. Given the court’s repeated contention
regarding the lack of evidence proving actual harm, it is somewhat confusing why the
court proceeds to decide the claims on the merits rather than dismissing the claims for lack
of standing. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 825 n.75. Instead, it is often difficult to assess the
Rokita court’s conclusions, given the court’s preference to dismiss claims as unsubstantiated
without articulating more substantive legal analysis. Id. at 819.
66
Id. at 820. Specifically, the court claimed that the plaintiffs had not presented
individual affidavits or statistical evidence of voters who will be severely or
disproportionately burdened by the law. Id. at 822-24.
[I]t is a testament to the law’s minimal burden and narrow crafting
that Plaintiffs have been unable to uncover anyone who can attest to
the fact that he/she will be prevented from voting . . . Lacking any
such individuals who claim they will be prevented from voting, we are
hard pressed to rule that SEA 483 imposes a severe burden on the right
to vote.
Id. at 823.
67
Id. at 826. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing rational basis-like
review under the Burdick test).
68
Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 826 (noting evidence of in-person voter fraud in other states).
69
Id. at 827.
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cost to registered voters lacking government-issued photo IDs.70
Similarly, the court held that the law did not impose secondary costs on
the right to vote.71 Specifically, the court held that most Indiana voters
already had government-issued photo IDs, eliminating the chance that
they would be forced to pay for a birth certificate to obtain a voter ID
card.72 The Rokita court bolstered this conclusion by pointing again to
the lack of affidavits of voters who actually incurred those costs.73 In the
alternative, the court held that the fees for acquiring a birth certificate
were set by the federal government and were out of the control of the
states.74
Having found the law to withstand all of the plaintiffs’ claims, the
Rokita court held that Indiana’s voter ID statute was a reasonable time,
place, and manner regulation, and granted the State’s motion for
summary judgment.75 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit affirmed the holding, making Indiana’s voter ID
statute the first and only of its kind to survive constitutional judicial
review.76

Id. at 827 n.80. See also IND. CODE § 9-24-16-10 (2007).
Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 827 (noting the transportation and monetary costs, necessary
to obtain a birth certificate). The court held that “the imposition of tangential burdens does
not transform a regulation into a poll tax.” Id.
72
Id. In making this conclusion, the court suspiciously relied on estimates taken from
the formerly rejected Brace Report. See supra note 68. It seems that the Rokita court both
“had its cake and ate it too,” in regards to its use of the plaintiffs’ primary evidence for
supporting the claim of voter disenfranchisement.
73
Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 827. The Rokita court held that it was “purely speculative”
that some voters would incur costs to obtain a birth certificate, given the lack of voter
affidavits from those incurring such a cost. Id.
74
Id. at 827.
75
Id. at 845. The Rokita court also dismissed numerous other claims against the voter ID
law, including federal and state Constitutional claims and statutory Civil Rights claims. See
generally id. at 828-43. However, these claims are beyond the scope of this paper, which
limits its analysis to federal Constitutional claims involving the First, Fourteenth, and
Twenty Fourth Amendments.
76
On January 4, 2007, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the Rokita decision, without
substantially changing the analysis of the district court. Crawford v. Marion County Elec.
Bd., 472 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2007). In a short opinion, authored by J. Richard Posner, the
court affirmed that, despite the potential for some voters to be disenfranchised by Indiana’s
voter ID law, there were no affidavits submitted to attest to disenfranchisement. Id. at 952.
The court also affirmed that Indiana’s voter ID law did not impose a poll tax that the
submitted statistical report was methodologically flawed and argued that the lack of
proven voter fraud in Indiana was due to the difficulty detecting in-person fraud, rather
than proof that it did not exist in the state. Id. at 952-53.
Most remarkably about the decision is J. Posner’s anecdotal discussion on how to
measure severe harm against the right to vote. See id. at 951-54. Posner, who is acclaimed
70
71
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Georgia

On August 26, 2005, Georgia became the second state to require a
government-issued photo ID in order to vote in-person.77 Similar to
Indiana’s law, passage of Georgia’s voter ID law created heated partisan
controversy in the state legislature and was ultimately passed along
strict party lines.78 In its original form, Georgia’s voter ID law was

for his theory of “Law and Economics,” argued in Crawford that the “severe” harm should
not be judged in the abstract terms of value of the right to vote to a few individuals (only a
small percentage of Indiana voters lacked a government-issued ID) but should rather be
judged in more objective and quantifiable terms. Id. at 952-53. To J. Posner it did not seem
to matter that some Indiana voters would be disenfranchised by the law, so long as the
number of those disenfranchised was small enough to offset the legislative purpose for
enacting the law. Id. at 954.
Although, the Crawford decision carries some controlling weight, this Note will rely
primarily on the opinion of the district court for discussion and will make reference to the
Crawford decision only as it is helpful for interpretation. Because the appellate court
affirmed on the same grounds as Rokita and did not substantially alter the court’s
reasoning, this Note uses the Rokita opinion for analysis because the reasoning is more
expansively articulated in the Rokita decision.
77
GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-417 (2003) (amended 2006). Prior to adoption of its voter ID
law, Georgia permitted seventeen forms of identification to access the polls. See David H.
Harris, Jr., Georgia Photo ID Requirement: Proof Positive of the Need to Extend Section 5, 28 N.C.
CENT. L.J. 172, 182 (2006) [hereinafter Proof Positive] (discussing previous acceptable forms
of identification). Similar to the Indiana law, Georgia’s voter ID statute permitted voters
without ID to cast a provisional ballot, stipulated on their ability to show proper
identification within forty-eight hours of the election. See Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d
1326, 1354 (N.D. Ga. 2005) (discussing the deposition of Georgia’s Secretary of State, Cathy
Cox). Election officials, the news media, and national legislators were quick to characterize
the new law as one of the “strictest” in the country. See Georgia’s New Poll Tax, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 12, 2005, at A20 [hereinafter Georgia’s New Poll Tax]; Ariel Hart, Georgia Voters May
Soon Need Photo IDs, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2006, at A15 [hereinafter Hart I]; Proof Positives,
supra note 77, at 195.
78
See Jim Tharpe, Photo ID Approval Brings Warning, Atlanta J.-Const., June 20, 2006, at
B1 [hereinafter Warning] (stating the Republican and Democrats were “at war” over the ID
requirement). State Democrats vigorously criticized the proposed law as an effort by their
Republican counterparts to suppress the votes of the poor, the elderly, and minorities;
groups who have a history of supporting Democratic candidates. See Brenda Goodman,
Judge Blocks Requirement in Georgia for Voter ID, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2006, at A10; Jill Young
Miller & Carlos Campos, Photo ID Hot Topic, ATLANTA J. AND CONST., July 19, 2006, at D6;
Cynthia Tucker, Our Opinion, ATLANTA J.-CONST., June 25, 2006, at C6 [hereinafter Our
Opinion June 25, 2006]; and Warning, supra note 78. State Republicans countered that the
vast majority of Georgians supported a photo identification requirement and that the new
requirement was reasonable. See Georgia’s Voter ID, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2005 at 4; Warning,
supra note 78. Ultimately, the law was passed along strict partisan lines. See Common Cause
I, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1331 (N.D. Ga 2005) (noting approval of the Conference Committee
Report along strict party lines). In addition to creating partisan disagreement, the
proposed voter ID law also provoked racial tension in the Georgia legislature, culminating
in a walk-out by the majority of the State’s African American lawmakers. See Associated
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unique because it mandated a direct fee to obtain a voter ID card, raising
concern among many legislators who saw the law as an effort to
suppress voting.79 Another concern among lawmakers was the fact that
Georgia’s photo ID requirement was limited to in-person voting despite
a lack of evidence of in-person voting fraud in the state.80 Additionally
suspect and seemingly in conflict with the proffered legislative purpose
of preventing voter fraud, Georgia’s legislature simultaneously loosened
restrictions on absentee voting, an area of voting where fraud had been
proven.81 Some argued that this shift in legislative preference toward
absentee ballots would have a disproportionate effect on many African
American voters who preferred to vote in-person out of historical
distrust of the electoral system.82
Upon passage of Georgia’s voter ID law,83 the Secretary of State’s
office issued a report indicating that 676,246 registered Georgia voters
lacked government-issued photo identification.84
The report was
Press, Lawsuit to be Filed Over New Voting Law in Georgia, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2005, at A17;
Hart I, supra note 77.
79
See Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1338, 1339-40. At the same time that Georgia
adopted its voter ID requirement, the state legislature also doubled the minimum cost for a
state-issued photo ID from $10 to $20 for a five year ID and authorized a $35 fee for a ten
year photo ID card. Id at 1337.
80
Id. at 1333-34, 1366.
81
See id. at 1332-35, 1352 (discussing the concerns of Georgia’s Secretary of State,
articulated in depositions and memoranda sent to the governor and state legislature). See
also Our Opinion June 25, 2006, supra note 78; Lyle V. Harris, Our Opinion, ATLANTA J.CONST., July 2, 2006, at C8 [hereinafter Opinion July 2, 2006]; Hart I, supra note 77 (quoting
Georgia’s Secretary of State’s as stating that the new law would “open the floodgates” to
“rampant fraud in absentee voting”).
82
See Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1353 (noting statistical data showing that, in
Georgia, Caucasians vote absentee more often than African Americans). Cf. Proof Positive,
supra note 77, at 194 (discussing the preference of African Americans to vote in-person due
to historical disenfranchisement).
83
See generally Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000). At the time of its adoption,
Georgia’s voter ID law remained subject to pre-clearance by the United States Justice
Department. On August 26, 2005, in a controversial decision, the Chief of the Voting
Division overruled the objection of four Justice Department attorney’s and granted
approval for the law. See generally Proof Positive, supra note 77. See also Criticism of Voting
Law Was Overruled, KANSAS CITY STAR, Nov. 17, 2005, at A.; Dan Eggen, Civil Rights Focus
Shift Roils Staff at Justice: Veterans Exit Division as Traditional Cases Decline, WASH. POST, Nov.
13, 2005, at A1; Dan Eggen, Justice Plays Down Memo Critical of Ga. Voter ID Plan, WASH.
POST, Nov. 18, 2005, at A3; NOW Transcript—Show 235, Sept, 1, 2006, available at,
http://www.pbs.org/now/transcript/235.html; William R. Yeomans, An Uncivil Division:
Political Appointees to the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division are Driving Career Lawyers
to Retirement—Then Skipping the Retirement Parties, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Sept./Oct. 2005, at 20.
84
Associated Press, More than 675,000 Georgia Voters Lack Photo ID, MACON TELEGRAPH,
June 19, 2006, at C. Despite such high numbers of Georgia voters without the requisite
photo IDs, the state legislature did not provide funding or plan public education efforts to
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criticized as “deceptive” by proponents of the law. However, the
potential disenfranchisement of such a large number of Georgia voters
created concern, particularly because the majority of those without photo
IDs were among politically vulnerable classes; namely minority,
indigent, and rural voters.85
a.

Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups (“Common Cause I”)

In the fall of 2005, Georgia’s voter ID law met its first of several legal
challenges, facing claims that the law imposed an undue burden on the
right to vote and created an unconstitutional poll tax. This case raised
nearly identical claims to those brought against Indiana’s voter ID law in
Rokita.86 Extensively, considering the factual background of the law, the
Common Cause I court noted the lack of in-person fraud in the state as
well as the failure of the new law to address proven fraud in absentee
voting and voter registration.87 Particularly influential in this regard
inform registered voters of the law’s new requirements. See Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp.
2d at 1332. But see Shannon McCaffrey, Georgia Voters Must Have Photo IDs: The U.S.
Department of Justice Cleared the Law Wednesday, and the Elections Board Decided to Require IDs
for the July 18 Primary, INTELLIGENCER, June 30, 2006, at A10. Relying primarily on the
education efforts of non-profit organizations, the state proposed only minimal education
outreach to voters. See Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1332. However, the state did
provide for limited voter-outreach to voters unable to access a DDS office. Id. at 1338-39.
At the time of the law’s passage, Georgia had only 58 DDS centers for all of the state’s 159
counties. Id. at 1338. Such a disparate spread of service centers can result in long drives,
particularly for rural voters. Id. See also Georgia’s New Poll Tax, supra note 77 (decrying the
law’s burden on rural voters).
85
See Georgia Republican Party: Common Sense Ignored by Another Fulton County Judge, US
FED. NEWS, July 7, 2006 (quoting Republican criticism of the Common Cause I decision); see
also Georgia’s New Poll Tax, supra note 77 (discussing impact on the poor); Hart I, supra note
77 (discussing concerns of the AARP, the ACLU, and the League of Women Voters and the
impact of the new law on rural voters); Our Opinion July 2, 2006, supra note 81 (expressing
concerns raised by the report and citing racial demographics of those without photo ID
from the Secretary of State’s report).
86
Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1354. The plaintiffs raised numerous statutory
Civil Rights claims as well. Id. at 1370-75. However, these claims are beyond the scope of
this paper and were not determinative in the outcome of the case. Id. Further, and more
important to the ultimate outcome of Georgia’s voter ID law, the plaintiffs also claimed that
Georgia’s photo ID requirement violated the Georgia state constitution by improperly
creating a non-enumerated prerequisite to voting. Id. at 1357. The Common Cause I court
dismissed the state claim as well, noting that the Eleventh Amendment barred the court
from review. Id. at 1357-58. However, on Sept. 9, 2006, a Georgia state court ultimately
held that the photo ID requirement violated the state constitution and permanently
enjoined the law, mooting the unresolved federal claims.
See Lake v. Perdue,
2006CV119207
(Sup.
Ct.
Fulton
County
Sept.
19,
2006),
available
at
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/StateInjunction.pdf
87
The court noted the legislative history of the new law, taking in the partisan passage
of the bill, the fee increase for all government-issued IDs, and the simultaneous loosening
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were the depositions of Georgia’s Secretary of State, Cathy Cox, who
argued that the simultaneous legislative changes to in-person and
absentee voting regulations were both unnecessary and “opened a
gaping opportunity for fraud.”88
Additionally, in sharp and
determinative contrast to the Rokita case, the Common Cause I court noted
hundreds of affidavits of would-be voters affected by the law, lending
support to the plaintiffs’ claim of voter disenfranchisement.89
Although Georgia was not the first state to enact a strict voter ID
requirement, Georgia’s voter ID law was the first to be tested in federal
court.90 Given the uncertainty of how to analyze the new form of voting
regulation, Common Cause I prudently chose to analyze the Equal
Protection claim under both traditional strict scrutiny and the Burdick
test.91 Under traditional strict scrutiny analysis, the court quickly
determined that Georgia’s voter ID law was not narrowly tailored to the
legislature’s stated interest in preventing fraud.92 Specifically, the court
reasoned that by making the law exclusively applicable to in-person
voting while simultaneously loosening the requirements for absentee
voting, the state “left the field wide open for voter fraud by absentee
voting.”93

of restrictions on absentee voting. Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1331-38. The court
also made note of the procedures for obtaining a photo ID, including the cost of obtaining a
birth certificate and the process for completing a poverty affidavit. Id. at 1338-40.
Additionally, the court considered the testimony of Secretary of State Cathy Cox who
explained that she had not received a single report of in-person voter fraud during her
tenure. Id. at 1350.
88
Id. at 1351. See also id. at 1332-35, 1361-62. Secretary of State Cox said that she had not
received a single report of in-person fraud during her nine-year tenure. Id. at 1350.
89
Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1340-42; Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups
(“Common Cause II”), 439 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1312-13 (N.D. Ga 2006). Alleged difficulties
included: (1) voters lacking a car; (2) voters lacking a drivers license or alternative form of
government-issued voter ID; (3) voters with mental of physical difficulties; (4) voters
lacking access to public transportation; (5) voters who lived far from their respective
registrar’s office; (6) voters who distrusted absentee voting; and (7) voters having difficulty
accessing the voter outreach van. Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1340-42.
90
Rokita was decided six months after the Common Cause I decision. See supra note 58.
91
The Common Cause I court characterized the right to vote as fundamental and
preservative of other rights, subject only to regulations which do not “unduly burden” the
right. Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1359. See supra notes 25-38 and accompanying
text (describing Equal Protection Analysis under the two tests).
92
Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1361.
93
Id. at 1362. In doing so, the court also dismissed the defendants’ argument that the
legislature was permitted to enact under-inclusive laws when attempting to remedy voter
fraud, holding instead that the state must “narrowly tailor” legislation which burdens a
fundamental right. Id. at 1361. Further, the court argued that the legislature “may not
choose the way of greater interference” but must instead “choose [the] less drastic means”
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Similarly, the court in Common Cause I concluded that Georgia’s
voter ID law would likely fail the Burdick test as well.94 First, the court
concluded that the “character and magnitude” of the asserted injury was
significant, given the likely disproportionate effect on voters from
vulnerable classes to whom the right to vote is of particularly high
value.95 Similarly, because the law made the exercise of the right to vote
extremely difficult, the court held that a strict scrutiny-like analysis
should be used under the Burdick test.96 This is in stark contrast to the
Rokita decision, which did not characterize the harm as severe, but
instead denied any disenfranchisement due to a lack of evidentiary
support.97
Pursuant to its analysis under the Burdick test, the Common Cause I
court held that the state’s interest in preventing voter fraud was
important, but reasoned that the law’s photo ID requirement did not
rationally serve that interest.98 Specifically, the court held that the law’s
photo ID requirement did “absolutely nothing to preclude or reduce the
possibility for the particular types of voting fraud that are indicated by
the evidence . . . .”99 Noting again the lack of evidence of in-person voter
fraud in the state and the simultaneous removal of absentee voting

to accomplish its purposes, particularly when the legislature has numerous “less
burdensome alternatives available.” Id at 1362. Specifically, the court pointed to the
effective use of previous identification requirements and criminal sanctions to prevent inperson voter fraud. Id.
94
Id. at 1362.
95
Id. The law’s potential disproportionate effect on voters from socially vulnerable
classes was influential in the court’s characterization of the injury as significant. Id. at 136566. See also supra note 8.
96
Common Cause, I 405 F. Supp. 2d at 1362, 1365. In concluding that the harm was
“severe,” the Common Cause I court noted the difficulty accessing state DDS offices and
held that the voter outreach van was not a feasible alternative for those who lacked
transportation. Id. at 1365. Similarly, the court held that the availability of free ID cards
through a poverty affidavit and the option of voting absentee were not reasonable
alternatives to standard in-person voting procedures, given that the alternatives were not
sufficiently publicized and were potentially stigmatizing. Id. at 1363-65. Additionally, the
court concluded that the ability to vote by provisional ballot was illusory, given the short
forty-eight hour time period allotted to return with a valid voter ID. Id. at 1365.
97
Indiana Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 824-25 (S.D. Ind. 2006). See
also supra note 76 and accompanying text (expounding on J. Posner’s unique argument in
Crawford regarding how severe harm should be determined). Judge Richard Posner
preferred to use objective and quantifiable evidence of disenfranchisement instead of
estimating severe harm in terms of the abstract value to voting to a relatively few number
of individuals. Id.
98
Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1366.
99
Id.
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restrictions, the court argued that Georgia’s voter ID law would have the
likely effect of increasing, not decreasing, fraud.100
Finally, in addition to concluding that Georgia’s voter ID statute
likely created an undue burden on the right to vote, Common Cause I also
held that the law likely imposed an unconstitutional poll tax.101
Specifically, the court faulted the suspect twenty dollar “fee” for a voter
ID card, characterizing it as a material requirement on the right to
vote.102 In addition, the court argued the poverty affidavit exception,
which allowed poor voters to obtain free ID cards in exchange for legal
affirmation of indigence, imposed a material requirement which would
have a chilling effect on voting.103 This is in contrast to Rokita which
upheld a similar provision in the Indiana voter ID law as an adequate
safeguard for preventing disenfranchisement.104 Holding completely
opposite to Rokita on both claims of undue burden and poll tax, the
Common Cause I court held that Georgia’s voter ID law was likely
unconstitutional and granted a preliminary injunction against the law.105
b.

Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups (“Common Cause II”)

In January of 2006, the Georgia legislature quickly replaced the
enjoined version of the 2005 statute with a nearly identical law, absent

Id. (“In short, HB 244 opened the door wide to fraudulent voting via absentee
ballots.”).
101
Id. The Twenty-Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution bars the imposition of a
monetary fee on the right to vote. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV. See also supra notes 39-45
(discussing Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding unconstitutional poll tax
requirements).
102
Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1366, 1370. The court argued that the state’s
attempt to characterize the twenty dollar cost as an administrative “fee” did not change it
from being a tax on the right to vote. Id. at 1366-67, 1369. Additionally, the court was
concerned that few voters would utilize a poverty affidavit, out of fear of perjury,
embarrassment, or simply because they were unaware of the exception. Id. at 1369-70. The
court noted that many voters lacking a government-issued ID did not believe themselves to
be indigent but did not have $20 to spend on a voter ID. Id. at 1340.
103
Id. at 1369-70. Even though the Georgia DDS claimed that they had a “no questions
asked” policy regarding the affidavits, the Common Cause I court held that the policy was
not publicized and was contrary to the stated purpose of the affidavit. Id. The court also
noted that many voters lacking government-issued ID did not believe themselves to be
indigent but did not have the $20 to spend on a voter ID. Id. at 1340.
104
Indiana Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 823 n.70, 824 n.73, 829 (S.D.
Ind. 2006).
105
Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1376 (stating “[i]n reaching this conclusion, the
Court observes that it has great respect for the Georgia legislature. The Court, however,
simply has more respect for the Constitution.”).
100
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the fee and poverty affidavit requirements.106 A month later, the
plaintiffs from the original Common Cause I suit sought another
injunction, asserting that the revised law was invalid on the same claims
as before.107 With the opportunity to review Georgia’s voter ID law a
second time and the Rokita decision for guidance on how to approach the
analysis, the Common Cause II court relied exclusively on the Burdick test
for analysis of the revised law.108
While mimicking Rokita’s framework for analysis, the Common Cause
II court diverged in its primary choice of analysis. The court relied solely
on the Burdick test and held that Georgia’s voter ID law imposed severe
harm on the right to vote given the law’s potential to disenfranchise
thousands of Georgia voters due to insufficient time to acquire
comporting ID before the approaching primary elections.109 Influential
in its conclusion, the Common Cause II court relied on a statistical
estimate of potential disenfranchisement created by Georgia’s Secretary
of State’s office, which indicated that nearly 700,000 Georgia voters
lacked a valid government-issued photo ID.110 The Common Cause II
court’s adoption of this statistical evidence is in stark contrast to the
Rokita court’s rejection of a similar report and its subsequent holding that
the harm imposed by Indiana’s voter ID law was not severe given the
lack of evidence of voter disenfranchisement.111 Proceeding under a
strict scrutiny-like analysis and using similar language to the previous
Common Cause I suit, the Common Cause II court reasoned that Georgia’s
voter ID law did not address known types of voter fraud in the state and
was therefore not narrowly tailored.112
However, the Common Cause II court rejected the claim that
secondary costs, incidental to acquiring identifying documents for an ID
GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-417 (2003) (amended 2006); see also Common Cause/Georgia v.
Billups (“Common Cause II”), 439 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1304-05 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (noting the
partisan passage of both versions of Georgia’s voter ID law).
107
Common Cause II, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 1297.
108
See generally id. at 1345-52.
109
Id. at 1346-49. The court also held that the law’s exceptions were unrealistic
alternatives to in-person voting. Id. Specifically, the court held that the exceptions of
absentee voting and voting by provisional ballot were insufficiently publicized, too
difficult for some voters, and made unrealistic demands upon some voters. Id.
110
Id. at 1311. The court also pointed out that the majority of those potentially
disenfranchised were elderly, infirm, indigent, or from a racial minority. Id. at 1304, 1311.
Additionally, the court repeated its prior assertion that that the loss of the right to vote to
vulnerable classes is “undeniably demoralizing and extreme, as those citizens are likely to
have no other realistic or effective means of protecting their rights.” Id. at 1350.
111
See Indiana Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 823-24 (S.D. Ind. 2006).
112
Common Cause II, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 1346-50.
106

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 42, No. 1 [2007], Art. 7

210

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

card, constituted a poll tax.113 Drawing on language directly from the
Rokita decision, the Common Cause II court reasoned that tangential
burdens on the right to vote were permitted and argued that incidental
costs to obtain birth certificates were “speculative.”114 Specifically, birth
certificates and other certified government documents were not
exclusively mandated to obtain a voter ID under Georgia’s statute.115
Thus, the Common Cause II court held that the revised law likely did not
impose an invalid poll tax.116
c.

Lake v. Perdue

On September 19, 2006, a Georgia state court permanently enjoined
Georgia’s voter ID law, holding that the state legislature exceeded its
authority under the Georgia constitution by impermissibly adding a
non-enumerated ground for denying the right to vote.117 Although this
case is not helpful for analyzing federal Equal Protection claims, it is
useful for demonstrating that, in addition to exceeding the general
regulatory power of the states under the federal constitution, state voter
ID laws can also improperly exceed the more narrowly defined
regulatory authority of state legislatures under state constitutions.118

Id. at 1355. The Common Cause II court commended the state legislature for amending
the statute to issue voter ID cards without cost to all voters who lacked a governmentissued photo ID. Id. at 1354. The alternative outcome in Common Cause II suggests that the
court felt the Georgia legislature had sufficiently amended the law by eliminating the fee
and poverty affidavit requirements.
114
Id. at 1355 (citing Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 827).
115
Id. The Georgia voter ID statute uniquely allows utility bills, employment-issued
photo IDs, and voter registration cards to prove identity for purposes of obtaining a voter
ID. See GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-417.1 (2006).
116
Common Cause II, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1355.
117
Lake v. Perdue, 2006CV119207 (Sup. Ct. Fulton County Sept. 19, 2006), available at
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/StateInjunction.pdf.
Specifically, the court held that the provisional ballot requirement of the law, requiring
voters without a photo ID to produce the requisite voter ID card within forty-eight hours of
voting in order to have their vote counted, improperly added a non-constitutionally
enumerated ground for denying the right to vote. Id. at 13-14.
118
Similar state constitutional claims were brought in federal court in Rokita and Common
Cause I. The Rokita court decided the claim on the merits, holding that the Indiana
legislature did not exceed its constitutional authority in enacting the statute. Indiana
Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 843 (S.D. Ind. 2006). Instead, the Rokita
court reasoned that the state legislature had exclusive authority to enact reasonable time,
place, and manner restrictions on the right to vote. Id. In contrast, the Common Cause I
court held that it did not have jurisdiction to decide the claim because of conflicts with state
and federal law, giving rise to the separate suit in Lake. Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups
(“Common Cause I”), 406 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1358 (N.D. Ga. 2005).
113
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Additionally, the Lake decision is important because it effectively mooted
the federal Equal Protection claim against the previously enjoined law.119
3.

Missouri

On June 14, 2006, Missouri became the third state to require a
government-issued photo ID in order to vote in-person.120 Similar to
other voter ID laws, Missouri’s statute passed quickly along strict
partisan lines.121 At the time of its passage, an estimated 170,000
registered Missouri voters, primarily seniors, the disabled, and the poor,
lacked a government-issued photo ID.122 Similar to Georgia, Missouri’s
Secretary of State, Robin Carnahan, expressed concern regarding the
law’s potential to disenfranchise and vowed to educate voters about the

Lake, 2006CV11920 at 15. The day after Fulton County Superior Court enjoined
Georgia’s voter ID law, the state Election Board mailed 79,496 letters to registered Georgia
voters without driver’s licenses, informing them where they could obtain a free voter ID.
Ernie Suggs, State Backtracks on Voter ID Alert, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Oct. 18, 2006, at A1
[hereinafter Backtracks]. Five days later, the state Board mailed an additional 115,747
letters. Id. Some claimed that the letters were intentionally sent by the Republicancontrolled election Board to confuse voters about the law’s requirements. See Vicky
Eckenrode, Voters Will Get Letters on IDs, THE AUGUSTA CHRON., Oct. 18, 2006, at B5.
Members of the U.S. Congress, concerned by the suspicious mailings, requested a federal
investigation. Lewis, Two Senators Request Voter ID Letter Investigation, MACON TELEGRAPH,
Oct. 22, 2006, at F. Likewise, on Oct. 16, 2006, former Governor Roy Barnes filed a civil
contempt suit against the Board. Ernie Suggs, Barnes Says Letters End his Voter ID Lawsuit,
ATLANTA J.-CONST., Oct. 19, 2006, at D7 [hereinafter Barnes Says]. The following day, the
Board decided to mail new letters, emphasizing that voter IDs were not required to vote,
and decided to issue public service announcements declaring the same. Voter ID Letter:
New Mailings Set to Clarify the Rules, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Oct. 22, 2006, at E4. Mailing the
new letters cost the state an additional $127,000. See Backtracks supra. As a result of the
Board’s remedial actions, Governor Barnes dropped his suit, but some argued that a federal
investigation was still necessary. See Barnes Says supra.
120
MO. ANN. STAT. § 115.427 (West 2003 & Supp. 2006). The Missouri law mandated that
the IDs be issued free of charge and uniquely permitted voters to cast a provisional ballot
without a voter ID until 2008, to allow voters time to comply with the new requirement.
See Virginia Young, State Starts Issuing Voter IDs, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June 15, 2006, at
A1 [hereinafter State Starts].
121
See Steve Walsh, Senate Cuts Off Debate and Approves Photo ID Voting Bill, May 12, 2006,
available at www.missourinet.com.
122
See Weinschenk v. Mo., 203 S.W.3d 201, 212-13 (Mo. 2006) (citing estimates between
169,215 and 240,000 voters). See also State Starts, supra note 120 (citing the number of
Missouri voters without IDs and discussing the difficulty for persons with disabilities to
obtain a voter ID); Missouri Secretary of State Carnahan Issues Statement on Photo ID Bill
Signing, US STATE NEWS, June 14, 2006 [hereinafter Statement] (quoting Secretary
Carnahan’s concerns about the new law). But see Letters from Readers, ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH, July 24, 2006, at B8 (state Senator Delbert Scott, proponent of the new legislation,
explains the law’s exception for senior citizens and touts the Department of Revenue’s
proposed outreach to nursing homes).
119
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new ID requirement before the 2006 midterm elections.123 In particular,
Secretary Carnahan and others feared that the new law would have a
disproportionate impact on indigent, disabled, and elderly voters, a
concern common to every state voter ID law thus far enacted.124 To
combat this concern, the Missouri Department of Revenue hired
temporary employees to provide outreach to the elderly and disabled by
contacting senior living facilities and sheltered workshops and
dispatching mobile outreach vans to process voter ID applications.125
Similar outreach was not provided for indigent voters.126

See Statement, supra note 122. Secretary of State Carnahan began a public awareness
initiative, “Show Your Face at the Polls,” to inform the general public about the
requirements of the new law, including a mass-mailing, public service announcements, a
toll-free help line, and a four-city tour across Missouri. See Secretary of State Carnahan
Launches Photo ID Awareness Campaign, U.S. STATE NEWS, July 21, 2006; Carnahan Promotes
Voter ID Law, ST. LOUIS BUS. J., July 25, 2006; Senate 2006 Missouri: Identification Problems,
AM. POL. NETWORK, July 26, 2006 [hereinafter Problems]. While expressing her eager intent
to vigilantly provide outreach to voters, Secretary Carnahan expressed frustration that the
legislature did not budget any money to finance voter outreach. See Statement, supra note
122; State Starts, supra note 120.
Department of Revenue offices are prevalent in Missouri, each equipped to distribute
IDs. Letters from Readers, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 1, 2006, at B6 (editorial submitted
by the Missouri Department of Revenue, emphasizing the numerous offices located across
the state, including nineteen within the city of St. Louis). However, as a result of the lack of
voter outreach, it is not surprising that Missouri voters did not quickly “catch on” to the
new ID requirement. During the first month that the law was in effect, only 629 of the
170,000 registered Missouri voters without a government-issued photo ID obtained a voter
ID. See Problems supra; Revenue Department Continues Proactive Push to Distribute Photo IDs in
Advance of November Election, U.S. STATE NEWS, July 21, 2006.
124
See State Starts, supra note 120. Most significantly, concern was raised regarding the
financial and time costs incidental to obtaining a birth certificate, a mandatory prerequisite
to achieve a voter identification card. Id. For example, the Department of Health and
Senior Services encouraged voters to allow two weeks to process requests for birth
certificates and up to six months if the documents need correction due to misspelling or
name changes. Id. But see Problems, supra note 123 (Missouri Governor Blunt discounted
the law’s financial effect on low-income voters). Documentary costs and other incidental
costs, such as the costs of time and transportation needed to obtain a voter ID, were not
provided for by the state. See State Starts, supra note 120 (quoting Missouri Governor Blunt,
“We’re not going to reimburse people who are driving to fulfill a civic obligation. That’s an
absurd suggestion.”).
125
See Virginia Young, Lawsuit is Filed Against Voter ID Law, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH,
July 18, 2006, at B1. Since adoption of the state voter ID law, mobile outreach was chiefly
initiated on an “as-needed” basis, determined through phone conversations with facility
administrators for the elderly and disabled. See Revenue Department Continues Proactive
Push to Distribute Photo IDs in Advance of November Election, U.S. STATE NEWS, July 21, 2006.
From these conversations, the Revenue Department concluded that about 25 percent of the
facilities had “no need” for a visit. Id.; see also Letters from Readers, ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH, Aug. 1, 2006, at B6 (quoting the Director of the Missouri Department of
Revenue, “[n]early 300 so far have told us there is no need.”). With such a high number of
123
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Weinschenk v. Missouri

On October 16, 2006, the Missouri Supreme Court struck down the
state’s voter ID law on state Equal Protection grounds.127 Reviewing the
law exclusively under the rubric of federal Equal Protection analysis, the
Weinschenk court seemingly combined what previous courts analyzed as
distinct Equal Protection and poll tax claims.128 In contrast to the
holdings of Rokita and Common Cause II, the Weinschenk court held that
the incidental costs of time and money, necessary to obtain a voter ID,
imposed direct costs on the right to vote and constituted “severe” harm
against the fundamental right.129
Unique in its analysis, the Weinschenk court astutely reasoned that
the Federal REAL ID Act mandated the states to require proof of
citizenship, exclusively through a birth certificate or U.S. passport, before
issuing a photo ID.130 Due to the statutory overlap, the Weinschenk court
reasoned that Missouri’s voter ID law indirectly forced some voters to
pay documentary costs before obtaining a voter ID card; directly

facility administrators rejecting voter outreach for their residents, it seems suspect how
much input was actually submitted from the residents themselves.
126
See Problems, supra note 123 (quoting Trish Vincent, Director of the Missouri
Department of Revenue, “[t]he law is clear. We are to work with older folks, the seniors
and the disabled, not the low-income.”).
127
Weinschenk v. Mo., 203 S.W.3d 201 (Mo. 2006). Although, the Weinschenk court’s
holding was based on the strict requirements of Missouri’s state constitution, the court’s
reasoning is useful as anecdotal analysis under the more general protections of the federal
Equal Protection clause. Id. at 219. For instance, although the Missouri state constitution
provided greater protection of the right to vote than its federal counterpart, the Weinschenk
court used strict scrutiny analysis to evaluate the severity of harm imposed by the Missouri
voter ID law; a method of analysis common to both state and federal constitutions. Id. at
212, 215-16. The only notable difference in the court’s analysis was the choice to use strict
scrutiny outright rather than under the Burdick test, in an effort to comport with the “more
protective” state constitution. Id. at 212, 216. Thus the Weinschenk court’s analysis is both
poignant and valuable for comparable Equal Protection challenges under the federal
Constitution. Id.
128
Id. at 210-19.
129
Id. at 213-14, 216. Distinguishing the present case from the holdings of Rokita and
Common Cause I, the Weinschenk court held that plaintiffs had proved through affidavits
that actual voters would be forced to incur monetary costs before obtaining the requisite
voter IDs. Id.
130
Id. at 207-08 (citing the REAL ID ACT, Pub. Law 109-13, Title II). See also Weinschenk,
203 S.W.3d at 208-09 (discussing secondary costs of time and money that are needed to
obtain a voter ID). The determination by the Weinschenk court that these secondary costs
imposed direct costs on the right to vote is in sharp contrast to the Rokita decision, where
the court held that characterizing such costs as a poll tax was a “dramatic overstatement of
what fairly constitutes a ‘poll tax.’” See Indiana Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d
775, 827 (S.D. Ind. 2005).
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imposing a more than “de minimus cost” on the right to vote.131
However, instead of characterizing these costs as a poll tax, the
Weinschenk court considered the combined effect of secondary costs, the
difficulty obtaining a voter ID, and the potential disenfranchisement of
240,000 voters as jointly imposing a severe burden on the fundamental
right to vote.132 In addition to documentary costs, the court found that
the law imposed heavy practical costs, such as time and travel.133
Given both the gravity of the harm and the more stringent
protections of the Missouri state constitution, the Weinschenk court
reasoned that the law must be reviewed outright under strict scrutiny
and not under the more flexible Burdick test.134 While finding that
Missouri’s interest in preventing fraud was compelling, the court held
that Missouri’s voter ID law was neither necessary nor narrowly tailored
to meet that interest.135 Thus, the court concluded that Missouri’s voter
ID law violated the Equal Protection clause of the state constitution.136

131
Weinschenk, 203 S.W.3d at 213. The court reasoned that the voter IDs are not free, so
long as voters were required to spend money to acquire a birth certificates or passport to
obtain a voter ID. Id. Additionally, the court noted that such costs would likely be forced
upon those least able to bear them. Id. at 214.
For Missourians who live beneath the poverty line, the $15 they must
pay in order to obtain their birth certificates and vote is $15 that they
must subtract from their meager ability to feed, shelter, and clothe
their families. The exercise of fundamental rights cannot be
conditioned upon financial expense.
Id. at 214.
132
Id. at 212-16.
133
The court noted that the waiting period to obtain a Missouri birth certificate can
extend between six to eight weeks. Id. at 208-09.
134
Id. at 215-16.
135
Id. at 217. The court also concluded that the State’s proffered interest in combating
perceived, but unproven, in-person voter fraud was insufficient to interfere with the
fundamental right to vote. Id. at 218.
[I]f this Court were to approve the placement of severe restrictions on
Missourians’ fundamental rights owing to the mere perception of a
problem in this instance, then the tactic of shaping public
misperception could be used in the future as a mechanism for further
burdening the right to vote or other fundamental rights.
Id. at 218.
136
Id. at 219, 221-22. Weighing heavily in the court’s analysis was the State’s concession
that the law did not seek to prevent known fraud in absentee voting and voter registration,
but rather attempted to eliminate in-person voter fraud, which was “not a problem in
Missouri.” Id. at 217. Following Weinschenk, the Missouri Republican Party issued a press
release calling it a “direct attack on free and fair elections by activist judges.” See Scott
Lauck, Missouri Republican Party Blames Voter ID Law Decision on the Court, MO. LAW.
WEEKLY, Oct. 23, 2006.
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C. Foreshadowing the Continued Development of Voter ID Law: Purcell v.
Gonzalez
Indicating the urgency of the issues created by state voter ID laws
and potentially foreshadowing future judicial review, the U.S Supreme
Court intervened less than three weeks before the 2006 midterm state
and federal elections in an Arizona federal case involving a
constitutional challenge to Arizona’s voter ID law.137
Without
commenting on the issues, the Court vacated a federal appellate court
injunction against the law, holding that enforcing the injunction would
likely create voter confusion so close to the upcoming elections.138
Although the Court subsequently granted certiorari in September of
2007, it is uncertain how the Supreme Court will ultimately rule on the
issues presented by state voter ID laws and how narrowly it will
construe its holding.139 Given the rising prevalence of state voter ID laws
across the nation and the high political and sociological stakes
accompanying them, however, it is certain that more legal challenges

137
Purcell v. Gonzalez, 127 S. Ct. 5 (2006). This Note does not directly discuss Arizona’s
voter ID law. However, Purcell is influential because the requirements of Arizona’s statute
and the issues raised are similar to those of voter ID laws in other states. See ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 16-579A (2006). See also Joyce Purnick, Parties Divided on Laws Requiring ID for
Voters, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Sept. 27, 2006, at 1R (discussing the legislative history of the
law’s enactment and concerns regarding disenfranchisement of the poor, the elderly, and
Native Americans in the state).
As a testament to the Court’s rapid intervention, the Court vacated a federal court
injunction against the law only one week after it had been ordered by the lower court. See
Purcell, 127 S. Ct at 7-8. What is most interesting in the Court’s decision is Justice Steven’s
concurring opinion, which suggested that allowing the midterm elections to proceed under
the new law would have the added advantage of producing a factual record of alleged
harms. Id. at 8. Such historical facts, he suggests, will assist courts evaluating
Constitutional claims against state voter ID laws in the future. Id. However, neither Justice
Stevens nor the U.S. Supreme Court indicated whether the Court would be utilizing such a
record in the near future. Id.
138
Id. at 7. Arizona voters had anticipated that the law would take effect ever since a
2004 state-wide referendum enacting the law. See David G. Savage, High Court Allows
Arizona to Enact New Voter ID Law, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2006, at 12 (explaining that the law
passed by 56% of the vote). Further, the Supreme Court chided the Court of Appeals for
giving insufficient deference to the factual findings of the District court and for
insufficiently justifying its decision. See Purcell, 127 S. Ct. at 7.
139
See supra note 137. In the Purcell opinion, the court did not indicate whether it would
soon take up the issue itself. However, on September 25, 2007, the Court granted certiorari
in Indiana Dem. Party v. Rokita. See 2007 WL 1999963 (2007); 2007 WL 1999941. See infra
notes 300-12 for further discussion regarding the pending Supreme Court appeal.
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will be brought in the future.140 Additionally, as a result of the diverse
outcomes and reasoning in the cases thus far decided, it is likely that the
case law regarding voter ID statutes will continue to develop differently
across separate jurisdictions.141 As courts continue to grapple with this
rapidly developing area of law, it may serve useful for future litigators
and legal scholars to understand what makes some claims more
successful than others.142 Focusing exclusively on Equal Protection and
poll tax claims, this Note turns now to a more detailed analysis of the
initial case law in search of such trends.143
III. ANALYSIS
Having considered the similar creation and divergent judicial
treatment of three voter ID laws, this Note will now attempt to reconcile
these initial cases in order to determine why some constitutional claims
have been more successful than others.144 In doing so, Part III serves as a
detailed analysis, comparing and contrasting current judicial
reasoning.145 In addition, Part III provides some commentary to clarify
and critique judicial reasoning that was insufficiently developed or
supported.146 Part III also examines how the law is presently developing
in order to anticipate how it might continue to develop in the future.147
Part III.A first considers Equal Protection claims which allege that state
voter ID statutes unduly burden the right to vote.148 Part III.B considers
poll tax claims against state voter ID laws.149
A. Equal Protection–Voter ID Statutes Unduly Burden the Right to Vote
Courts evaluating Equal Protection challenges to state voter ID laws
have varied in the use of outright strict scrutiny and the Burdick test,

140
At the time of this writing, legal challenges and appeals were pending in Arizona,
Michigan, New Mexico, and Ohio. See Moritz College of Law, Ohio State University, Major
Pending Election Law Litigation, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation.
141
See id.
142
See infra Part III (discussing the judicial outcomes of the earliest challenges against
state voter ID laws).
143
See infra Part III.
144
See generally infra Part III.
145
See generally infra Part III.
146
See generally infra Part III.
147
See generally infra Part IV (attempting to synthesize these insights into a blueprint for
successful litigation against state voter ID laws in the future).
148
See infra Part III.A.
149
See infra Part III.
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often providing little or no direct insight into their choice of analysis.150
Regardless whether the court selects strict scrutiny analysis outright or
as part of the Burdick test, it is the court’s decision to use the more
stringent analysis subsequently under either approach that is often
determinative of the ultimate success of the claim.151 Thus, it is
important for those considering bringing claims against state voter ID
laws to understand the factors which appear most influential in the
courts’ determination to use strict scrutiny analysis.152
1.

A Uniform Standard for Analyzing State Voter ID Laws is Still
Developing

A likely reason for the lack of a uniform judicial approach for
analyzing state voter ID laws is the sheer newness of the developing law,
with different judges experimenting with alternative approaches.153
However, more recent cases may indicate a potential shift in judicial
preference towards exclusive reliance on the Burdick test. For example,
Common Cause I, the first court to decide an Equal Protection claim
against a state voter ID law, prudently chose to analyze the law under
both standards, given the lack of established case law.154 In Common
Cause II, however, the court had the opportunity to re-analyze a nearly
identical voter ID law but only evaluated the law under the Burdick
test.155 Neither the evidence nor the claims substantially changed in the
interim period between Common Cause suits.156 What did change during
the interim period was the resolution of the Rokita case, analyzing
Indiana’s voter ID law exclusively under the Burdick test and providing
legal precedent for the Common Cause II court.157 Given the dramatic
shift in the court’s choice of analysis, without any significant changes in
the record, it can be reliably inferred that the Common Cause II court

See supra notes 66-68, 91-100, 108-12, 134-36 (citing judicial analysis and outcome in the
initial legal challenges to state voter ID laws).
151
See supra notes 66-68, 91-100, 108-12, 134-36 (citing judicial analysis and outcome in the
initial legal challenges to state voter ID laws).
152
See infra Part IV (citing importance of striking down stringent voter ID laws that will
disproportionately disenfranchise vulnerable classes of voters).
153
See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text (discussing the Common Cause court’s
evolving choice of analysis in the subsequent suits).
154
Common Cause/Georgia v. Burdick, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1361-66 (N.D. Ga. 2005)
(Common Cause I).
155
Id. at 1345-53.
156
Indeed, the Common Cause II court also used nearly identical language in a substantial
part of its opinion. Compare Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1362-66, with Common
Cause/Georgia v. Burdick, 439 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1345-53 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
157
See Indiana Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775 (S.D. Ind. 2006).
150
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modeled its analysis after the Rokita decision, in an attempt to adopt a
more uniform standard for analyzing state voter ID laws.158
Another factor that may influence a court’s choice of analysis is how
the particular court resolves the tension between the “conflicting
constitutional principles” of the state’s authority to regulate elections
and the constitutional protection of the fundamental right to vote.159 The
subtle drafting differences in the courts’ legal standards, some courts
strongly characterizing the right to vote as fundamental while others
more expansively articulating the states’ authority to regulate elections,
directly correlates with the standard of review adopted by each court.160
For instance, both Common Cause courts and the Weinschenk court
strongly emphasized the right to vote as fundamental but only briefly
mentioned the state’s regulatory authority, making clear that provisions
in state and federal constitutions limited the authority.161 All three
courts acknowledged that the state had some regulatory authority over
federal elections but tempered this with case law suggesting limitation
on the state’s authority.162 Reflecting their similar depiction of the
conflicting principles involved, all three courts also adopted strict
scrutiny analysis and struck down the challenged voter ID laws as
imposing a severe and undue burden on the right to vote.163
In contrast, the Rokita court only cursorily acknowledged the right to
vote as fundamental, yet quickly and more expansively emphasized that
the right was not absolute and was subject to the state’s “broad”
authority to “impose extensive restrictions on voting.”164 Similarly, the
Rokita court only cursorily mentioned the limitations on the state’s power
to regulate.165 Reflecting this characterization and diverging from the
Common Cause and Weinschenk decisions in both choices of analysis and
See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 821.
160
See infra notes 161-66 and accompanying text.
161
The Common Cause courts emphasized both the fundamental nature and the extreme
importance of the right to vote, underscoring that voting is essential to preserving other
rights. See Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1359; Common Cause II, 439 F. Supp. 2d at
1343-44. Similarly in Weinschenk, the court emphasized that the fundamental right to vote
was protected against state regulatory authority by both the Federal Constitution and the
more protective Missouri Constitution. See Weinschenk v. Mo., 203 S.W.3d 201, 210-12
(Mo. 2006).
162
See supra note 130.
163
See Common Cause II, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 1350-51; Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at
1361-62, 1366; Weinschenk, 203 S.W.3d at 215-18.
164
Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 820-21.
165
Id.
158
159
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outcome, the Rokita court proceeded under the Burdick test and rational
basis review and concluded that Indiana’s voter ID law was a valid
“time, place, and manner” restriction on the right to vote.166
At first glance, the courts’ asymmetrical descriptions, subtly favoring
either the constitutional protections of the fundamental right to vote or
the power of the states to regulate elections, may not appear significantly
influential in their choice of analysis.167 However, given the courts’
distinct characterizations of these “potentially conflicting constitutional
principles” and the corresponding level of deference granted to the
states’ enactment of voter ID laws, the courts’ subtle descriptions of the
competing rights may actually represent more careful judicial drafting.
Such careful drafting might reflect a preferred resolution to the tension
created by state voter ID laws.168
In sum, the choice of judicial standard for reviewing state voter ID
laws is still developing.169 While it may be helpful to be able to predict
which standard a court will likely use to review an Equal Protection
claim, the court’s initial choice of standard is not always determinative of
the outcome of the claim.170 This is especially true, given that a court
may use strict scrutiny analysis under the Burdick test as well as outright,
so long as the court determines the harm to the right to vote is severe.171
What is important is not that the court adopts traditional strict scrutiny
outright, but rather that the court ultimately decides to utilize strict
scrutiny analysis if it chooses to review the challenged regulation under
the Burdick test.172

Id. at 820-21, 823-26, 845.
See supra notes 161-66 and accompanying text (discussing the correlation between the
court’s drafting of legal standard and its subsequent choice of analysis).
168
See supra note 159 and accompanying text (the Rokita court’s decision to discuss the
“conflicting” constitutional principals suggests that the court was concerned with this
tension and was attempting to resolve it through its choice of judicial analysis).
169
At the time of this writing several legal challenges against state voter ID laws were
pending, with new challenges being raised as frequently as the development of the laws.
See supra note 140 and accompanying text (citing pending challenges).
170
See supra notes 108-12 and accompanying text (Common Cause II’s decision to
exclusively rely on the Burdick test did not prevent that court from striking down Georgia’s
revised voter ID statute).
171
See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text (describing judicial analysis under the
Burdick test).
172
Id.
166
167
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The Use of Strict Scrutiny Analysis is Justified by Evidence of
“Severe” Harm

The sufficiency and reliability of evidence used by the plaintiffs to
show “severe” harm is largely determinative on a court’s decision to
utilize strict scrutiny as part of its Equal Protection analysis.173 The types
of evidence most influential in this determination of “severe” harm—
including affidavits of registered voters, prohibited or dissuaded from
voting as a result of a voter ID law, and statistical reports—estimate the
extent of potential disenfranchisement imposed by the law.174
Additionally, determining the extent to which a voter ID law makes the
exercise of the right to vote more difficult as a whole is also useful for
proving “severe” harm to the right.175
The use of affidavits is essential to show actual voters are affected by
the law.176 Without these, a court may quickly determine that the harm
is not severe and dismiss the claim under rational basis review.177 For
example, in the Common Cause cases, hundreds of affidavits of voters
adversely affected by Georgia’s voter ID law were submitted to show
actual and “severe” harm.178 Similar affidavits were not submitted in
Rokita, an omission that the court severely criticized at numerous points
in its analysis.179 In fact, Rokita’s primary justification for holding that
the harm was not severe and for rejecting nearly every claim brought
against Indiana’s voter ID law was the plaintiffs’ apparent inability to
identify a single voter affected by the law.180 Somewhat incredulously,
but arguably justified on strict evidentiary grounds, the Rokita court
reasoned that the plaintiffs’ failure to submit such affidavits was proof

Although this terminology sounds specific to analysis under the Burdick test,
characterizing the harm as severe is also useful for judicial analysis under outright strict
scrutiny as well. See supra notes 32-38.
174
See supra notes 62-65, 110-12 and accompanying text (discussing the different
approaches of both the Rokita and Common Cause II courts towards such evidence).
175
See infra note 193 and accompanying text. Such difficulties include: the complexity of
obtaining a voter ID, insufficient voter education, inadequate alternatives, and the
disproportionate impact on poor, elderly, disabled, and minority voters.
176
See infra notes 178-81 and accompanying text (discussing Rokita’s criticism of the lack
of this type of evidence submitted to prove actual harm).
177
Id.
178
See supra note 89.
179
Indiana Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 784 n.6, 822-23 (S.D. Ind.
2006); see also supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
180
Rakita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 822-23.
173
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that the law was both narrowly tailored and equipped with sufficient
safeguards to avoid disenfranchising voters.181
Similarly, the use of statistical reports to estimate the scope of voter
disenfranchisement is essential for establishing the alleged harm as
severe and for justifying the utilization of strict scrutiny analysis.182
Influential factors in the courts’ reliance on such reports as evidencing
“severe” harm are the scientific integrity of the reports and the source
and purpose of creating the report.183 For example, in Common Cause II,
the plaintiffs submitted a report created by the Georgia Secretary of
State’s Office drafted pursuant to the state legislature’s consideration of
the proposed voter ID law.184 The report, made from statistical
comparisons of voter registration lists and DDS licensing information,
estimated that 676,246 registered voters lacked an ID.185 This report was
accepted by the court to prove severe harm.186
In sharp contrast, the Rokita plaintiffs submitted a report using
similar comparisons. However, that report was created by a statistical
expert and made pursuant to the litigation.187 The Rokita court
completely rejected this report as wholly unreliable evidence, severely
criticizing the scientific methods used and the motive for creating the
report.188 Similar to the effect of its conclusions regarding the lack of
Id. at 823.
See infra notes 184-86 and accompanying text (discussing use of statistical evidence in
Common Cause II and its effect on the court’s ultimate conclusion).
183
Id.
184
Common Cause II, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 1306. It is uncertain why the plaintiffs did not
submit this report in Common Cause I as well. It is also uncertain why the Secretary of State
denied having knowledge of the numbers of voters without ID in her testimony and
depositions. See Common Cause II, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 1331; Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d
at 1353.
185
Common Cause II, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 1311.
186
Id. at 1345-46. The court also noted statistical reports made from census data and data
from the U.S. Department of Transportation estimated the number of voters without
comporting photo ID to be 874,420. Id. at 1306.
187
Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 803-04. Both the Common Cause II and Rokita statistical
reports estimated potential voter disenfranchisement by comparing voter registration rolls
with state licensing records. Id. (criticizing the Brace Report for comparing current voter
rolls with census data from several years ago); Common Cause II, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 1311; see
also 675,000 Voters, supra note 84.
188
See generally Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 803-10. The Rokita court’s disfavor of the
statistical evidence was so strong that the court held it was entitled to “zero weight” in the
court’s determination of summary judgment. Id. at 804. Although the Rokita court
specifically criticized the methods used to create the data and did not elaborate on its claim
of illicit motive, given the marked similarities in the methods used to create the reports in
Common Cause II and Rokita, the source and motive may have also played a role in the
courts analysis.
181
182
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voter affidavits, the effect of the Rokita court’s decision to discard the
statistical report caused the dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims as “purely
speculative[,]” and further supported the argument that the lack of
evidence suggesting voter disenfranchisement was proof that the law
was narrowly tailored and did not cause significant harm.189
The practical effect of Rokita’s rejection of the plaintiffs’ evidence and
subsequent dismissal of the claims was that the court was forced, or
perhaps chose, to turn a “blind eye” to the potential disenfranchisement
of thousands of Indiana voters.190 Regardless of the court’s reasoning,
Rokita serves as a stern warning to those bringing Equal Protection
claims against state voter ID laws to include a significant number of
voter affidavits and scientifically reliable statistical reports to prove
disenfranchisement.191
Finally, in addition to voter affidavits and statistical reports, the use
of evidence to show that exercising the right to vote is made more
difficult by a state voter ID law is also essential to show severe harm and
to justify the court’s adoption of a strict scrutiny analysis.192 For
example, these types of evidence show: (1) difficulty obtaining a voter
ID; (2) insufficient voter outreach; (3) potential disenfranchisement of
politically vulnerable classes; (4) inadequate alternatives to the law; (5)
inadequate voter education; and (6) insufficient time to obtain a voter ID
before the upcoming primary elections. 193
3.

Use of Strict Scrutiny is Likely Determinative of the Success of the
Claim

A court’s choice of analysis regarding Equal Protection challenges
against state voter ID laws is likely determinative of the outcome of the

Id. at 825 n.75.
See supra note 60 and accompanying text (discussing the estimated number of Indiana
voters potentially affected by the law).
191
Id.
192
See Common Cause II, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 1345-50; Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at
1362-66.
193
See Common Cause II, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 1345-50; Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at
1362-66. These claims and others were raised in both Common Cause suits and were
influential in the court’s determination of the harm as severe. See Common Cause II, 439 F.
Supp. 2d at 1345-50; Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1362-66. Nearly identical concerns
were raised in Rokita; however, because the court had previously rejected the plaintiffs’
statistical evidence and had faulted the plaintiffs for failing to provide voter affidavits to
show proof of disenfranchisement, the court did not give significant consideration to them.
See Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 824.
189
190
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claim.194 If a court chooses strict scrutiny, either outright or under the
Burdick test, the voter ID law will likely be struck down.195 Alternatively,
if the court chooses to use rational basis review under the Burdick test,
the court will likely uphold the voter ID statute as a reasonable time,
place, and manner restriction on voting.196 For those cases proceeding
under strict scrutiny, it is probable that the court will hold the regulatory
interest in preventing voter fraud is compelling.197 Actual proof of inperson voter fraud may not be necessary to justify the regulatory interest
as compelling; however, a regulation enacted to prevent perceived voter
fraud may be insufficient to qualify as a compelling.198
Additionally, for those cases proceeding under strict scrutiny, the
case law indicates that to be considered narrowly tailored, a voter ID law
must actually address proven types of fraud in the state.199 For instance,
in Common Cause I, the court found it counter-intuitive that the state
legislature would impose severe restrictions on in-person voting where
there had been no proof of fraud, while simultaneously loosening
restrictions on absentee voting where actual voter fraud had been
See supra notes 66-68, 91-100, 108-12, 134-36 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 91-100, 108-12, 134-36 and accompanying text (discussing holdings of
the Common Cause and Weinschenk cases).
196
See supra notes 66-68 (discussing the Rokita holding).
197
See Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 826; see also Common Cause II, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 1349-50;
Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1362; Weinschenk, 203 S.W.3d at 217. When the
government’s interest is defined broadly to prevent voter fraud the interest has been held
sufficiently important or compelling. Id. A more narrowly defined interest in preventing
in-person voter fraud may be harder for the government to justify, given that no states,
enacting voter ID laws, have been able to present evidence of in-person fraud in state. Id.
198
Weinschenk, 203 S.W.3d at 218. Using perceived harm as a justification for creating
laws which impacted a fundamental right, such as voting, was emphatically rejected by the
Weinschenk court. Id. Legislating on voter perception of fraud is insufficient to justify
government interference with the fundamental right to vote. Id. The Weinschenk court
analyzed the law under strict scrutiny which requires narrow tailoring between the
government’s interest and the means used to advance that interest. Id. at 215. In contrast,
the Rokita court held that the state did not have to empirically justify its legislative purpose;
however, if required to do so, despite a lack of evidence of in-person voting fraud in
Indiana, evidence of in-person voter fraud in other states created the potential for fraud in
Indiana and created voter perception of fraud, sufficiently justifying the enactment of
Indiana’s voter ID law. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 826. One explanation for such divergent
opinions regarding the use of evidence of perceived fraud to justify the state’s interest is
that the Rokita court utilized rational basis-like analysis which is highly deferential to the
legislature. Id.
199
Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1361-62. Several factors contributed to the court’s
conclusion that the law was not narrowly tailored: (1) the lack of evidence proving inperson voter fraud, (2) the legislative decision to loosen absentee ballot restrictions, (3) the
legislative decision not to address known voter registration fraud, and (4) the availability of
successful, less restrictive alternatives to prevent fraud. Id.
194
195
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proven.200 Similarly, narrow tailoring demands that the legislature
choose the least drastic means available when burdening the
fundamental right to vote.201 For example, in Common Cause I, the court
argued that the use of criminal sanctions to deter in-person voting fraud
and the more flexible list of documents to verify voter identity were
effective and “less drastic” means for accomplishing the state’s purpose
of preventing voter fraud.202
In sum, a court’s decision to use strict scrutiny analysis to review an
Equal Protection challenge to a voter ID law is crucial to the success of
the claim.203 A court may choose to use strict scrutiny either outright or
under the Burdick test.204 Regardless of the standard adopted, however,
in order for a court to justify utilizing strict scrutiny, it must first
determine that the harm imposed upon the right to vote is severe.205
Severe harm is shown through voter affidavits and statistical reports
which suggest voter disenfranchisement and through evidence showing
that the right to vote has been made more difficult by the requirements
of a voter ID statute.206 Once a court adopts strict scrutiny analysis, it
will likely find that the state has a compelling interest in preventing
fraud, but will probably hold that the voter ID law is not narrowly
tailored due to a lack of proven in-person fraud in the state.207
B. Poll Tax–Voter ID Statutes Impose a Direct Cost on the Right to Vote
Another constitutional challenge with varying success thus far is the
claim that state voter ID laws create an unconstitutional poll tax by
imposing an impermissible cost on the right to vote.208 There are two
200
Id. at 1366. The court relied heavily on testimony of Secretary of State Cathy Cox, who
testified to the lack of in-person fraud in comparison to the prevalence of fraud in voter
registration and absentee voting. Id. at 1350-52. Similarly, while subsequently reviewing
the law under the Burdick test, the Common Cause I court additionally argued that the law
was likely not even rationally based on preventing voter fraud. Id. at 1366.
201
Id. at 1361.
202
Id. at 1362.
203
See supra notes 194-202 and accompanying text.
204
See supra notes 194-202 and accompanying text.
205
See supra notes 194-202 and accompanying text.
206
See supra notes 194-202 and accompanying text.
207
See supra notes 194-202 and accompanying text.
208
See supra notes 34-45 and accompanying text (discussing the legal tests used to analyze
poll tax challenges against state voter ID laws). In federal courts, plaintiffs have argued
that state voter ID laws violate the Fourteenth and Twenty-Fourth Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution. See Common Cause II, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 1352; Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d
at 1367-68; Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 826-27. However, in Weinschenk, a Missouri court
analyzed the imposition of such costs under the state Equal Protection clause, but
characterized the costs in terms of an “undue burden” on the right to vote. Weinschenk, 203
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possible ways in which to argue that a state voter ID law creates an
unconstitutional poll tax.209 The first argument, claiming that a state
voter ID law imposes primary costs on the right to vote, has only been
successful in one case where the state mandated and simultaneously
increased a direct fee to obtain a voter ID.210 Because most states now
require that voter IDs be issued without charge, a more common
argument is that secondary costs, incidental to obtaining a voter ID,
impose impermissible costs on the right to vote.211 Thus far, such
secondary cost arguments have had limited success.212 However, recent
case law suggests that such claims may be more effective in future cases
due to recent judicial analysis revealing an overlap between state voter
ID laws and the REAL ID Act, which together necessitate incurring
documentation costs to obtain a voter ID.213
1.

Voter ID Statutes Impose Primary Costs on the Right to Vote

A poll tax is likely found whenever a material requirement is directly
imposed as a pre-requisite to voting.214 In the cases analyzing voter ID
laws thus far, both a twenty dollar fee and a poverty affidavit
requirement have been held to be impermissible primary costs on the
right to vote.215 It did not appear difficult for the Common Cause I court
to hold that Georgia’s $20 fee to obtain a voter ID imposed a direct cost
on the right to vote.216 Although the state argued that the fee was
necessary to offset the administrative costs of distributing the IDs, the
S.W.3d at 210-19. Although the Weinschenk holdings are based on a state Constitution and
made pursuant to equal protection analysis, the court’s reasoning regarding direct and
indirect costs on the right to vote remains applicable for comparison with federal poll tax
claims as well. Id.
209
See supra notes 34-45 and accompanying text.
210
Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1366-70. The Georgia state legislature
simultaneously raised the cost of IDs when passing the voter ID law. See supra note 79 and
accompanying text. The Common Cause I court held that, even though the state attempted
to justify the cost as covering administrative costs, the law still imposed an impermissible
fee on the right to vote. Id. at 1366, 1369.
211
See supra notes 71-73, 113-16, 128-36 and accompanying text (discussing judicial
analysis of claims that state voter ID laws impose secondary costs on the right to vote).
212
See Common Cause II, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 1355-56 (rejected poll tax claims based on
secondary costs); Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 827 (same).
213
As more states adopt the requirements of the Real ID Act of 2005, such secondary cost
claims will likely gain more success as courts will have less room to argue that such costs
are avoidable through use of more flexible lists of acceptable proof of identity to obtain a
state-issued voter ID.
214
See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text (providing a brief overview of TwentyFourth Amendment precedent).
215
Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1369-70.
216
Id.
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court argued that calling it a fee instead of a cost did not change it from
being a cost on the right to vote.217 Given that no states have since
included a fee requirement in subsequently-enacted voter ID laws, it
appears likely that the Common Cause I opinion has served as a
bellwether against such requirements.218
Similarly, although somewhat less clear for predicting future judicial
decisions, Common Cause I additionally held that the requirement for
indigent voters to sign a poverty affidavit in order to vote without an ID
imposed a direct and material cost on the right to vote.219 Primarily, the
Common Cause I court held that the poverty affidavit alternative was
unconstitutional because it would cause some to forgo voting out of
embarrassment or fear of perjuring themselves, having a chilling effect
on voting.220 However, in muddling contrast, the Rokita court upheld a
similar provision in the Indiana voter ID law, holding that Indiana’s
poverty affidavit exception was an adequate safeguard for preventing
disenfranchisement of indigent voters.221
On their faces, the two outcomes appear somewhat irreconcilable,
especially given the limited reasoning provided by the Rokita court’s
decision.222 However, for those attempting to litigate the issue in the
future, it may prove useful to emphasize that voter ID laws’ poverty
affidavit requirements will have a chilling effect on the votes of low
income voters.223 As with all claims, this argument should be supported
by affidavits of low-income and truly-indigent voters, unwilling to sign

Id. at 1366, 1369.
See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text (discussing the court’s reasoning in
Common Cause I).
219
Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1369-70 (2005).
220
Id. Even though the Georgia DDS claimed that they had a “no questions asked”
policy regarding the affidavits, the Common Cause I court held that the policy was not
publicized and was contrary to the stated purpose of the affidavit. Id. The court also
noted that many voters lacking government-issued ID did not believe themselves to be
indigent but did not have the $20 to spend on a voter ID. Id. at 1340-42.
221
See Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 823 n.70, 824 n.73, 829 (arguing perfunctorily that the
indigency exception served as an adequate safety valve to prevent indigent and homeless
voters from losing their right to vote). Indiana’s “indigency exception” permitted indigent
voters to vote by provisional ballot without and ID, conditioned on their return to sign a
poverty affidavit the following week. Id.
222
See supra notes 220-21.
223
Additionally, a potential Equal Protection challenge may exist, given that such
requirements mandate that the poor take additional steps to vote, both in having to sign an
affidavit attesting to their indigence and in having to make extra trips to the clerk’s office to
insure that their votes are counted.
217
218
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such documents or unable to make multiple trips to ensure that their
votes are counted.224
2.

Voter ID Statutes Impose Secondary Costs on the Right to Vote

The more likely poll tax claim to be brought against state voter ID
laws is that voter ID laws impermissibly require voters to incur
secondary documentation costs to obtain a government-issued photo
ID.225 The most commonly alleged documentation costs are the
monetary expenses incurred while gathering certified documentation of
identity, requisite in some states to obtain a government-issued photo
ID.226
Rokita, the first court to consider the issue, summarily rejected the
argument that secondary costs imposed by voter ID laws impose an
impermissible poll tax.227 Characterizing the argument as a “dramatic
overstatement of what fairly constitutes a ‘poll tax,’” the court argued
that such tangential burdens were incidental to all forms of voting and
did not transform a valid voting “regulation” into a poll tax.228 Although
the court surmised that the costs of obtaining a birth certificate might
plausibly be regarded as imposing a cost on the right to vote, the Rokita
court argued that the chance of voters having to incur the costs was
“purely speculative,” given that the plaintiffs had not presented
affidavits of voters actually incurring them.229 Alternatively, the Rokita
court deflected responsibility for such costs, should they exist, away from
the states claiming that the federal government was responsible for
setting the costs of such documents.230 In effect, the Rokita court
attempted to speak out of both sides of its mouth, arguing on the one
hand that voters are unlikely to incur documentation costs while
simultaneously arguing that, should voters actually incur such costs, the
224
See supra notes 176-81 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of using
voter affidavits to prove harm).
225
See supra notes 211-13 and accompanying text.
226
See supra notes 211-13 and accompanying text.
227
Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 827.
228
Id.
229
Id. To further support its reasoning that few voters would be adversely affected by
Indiana’s voter ID law, the Rokita court, using statistical conclusions from the previously
rejected Brace Report, noted that the majority of Indiana residents already had a stateissued photo ID. Id. The Brace Report estimated that, as of 2005, fewer than 1 percent of
Indiana’s voting age population, approximately forty-three thousand residents, lack ID. Id.
at 807. However, with numerous elections being decided on less than a few thousand votes
in recent years, this small percentage of potentially disenfranchised voters has significant
potential to sway the outcome of elections in tighter races.
230
Id. at 827-28.
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ultimate responsibility for documents issued by the federal government
rests on the federal government and not the Indiana legislature.231
The court’s argument that the majority of Indiana voters will not
have to pay a fee in the process of obtaining a voter ID, while potentially
sound on a strict evidentiary basis because of the lack of supporting
affidavits, is illogical and potentially dangerous.232 Because the express
requirements of the Indiana voter ID law mandate the showing of
government documentation such as a birth certificate in order to obtain a
voter ID, it is almost impossible to believe that no Indiana voters will
ever have to obtain such a document.233 Additionally making the court’s
argument particularly suspect, is that rather than simply dismissing the
claim for lack of evidentiary support, the Rokita court went further to
hold that the lack of evidence was “a testament to the law’s minimal
burden and narrow crafting” and proof of the law’s adequate safeguards
against disenfranchisement.234 Even without affidavits, it seems to go
against common sense and rudimentary statutory interpretation to
accept the court’s conclusion that few Indiana voters would be
disenfranchised by the law, particularly on account of the safeguards
within the voter ID law itself.235
Similarly, in reaching its conclusions to deflect responsibility for
federal documentation costs, should they actually occur, onto the federal
government, the Rokita court ignores that the Indiana legislature
expressly required voters to present certified government identification
in order to obtain a voter ID.236 Thus, regardless of which legislative
Id.
The fundamental right to vote is arguably the most important right because it is the
only way to secure other rights in a representative democracy.
See Common
Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1359 (N.D. Ga. 2005). If even a relatively
few number of voters are forced to incur costs in order to vote, or, worse, choose to forgo
voting because of inability to pay the cost, the social harm would be severe. But see supra
note 76 (J. Richard Posner argues that severe harm should be determined by quantifiable
numbers of disenfranchisement rather than by subjective value judgments regarding the
right to vote).
233
The Indiana statute expressly mandates that a registered voter must show a primary
identifying document, exclusively limited to a birth certificate, passport, or merchant
marine photo ID. See Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 790 (highlighting the primary document
requirement).
234
Id. at 823.
235
It might be argued that, in coming to its conclusion, the Rokita court relied on the
ability of voters without a birth certificate to forgo obtaining an ID and voting by absentee
ballot as a way of circumventing documentation costs. However, this argument is also
suspect because it encourages voters to seek ways around the law rather than allowing
them to comply with its requirements without cost.
236
See IND. CODE §§ 3-5-2-40.5, 3-10-1-7.2, 3-11-8-25.1 (2006).
231
232
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body ultimately sets the costs for acquiring such documents, it was the
state’s voter ID law and not the federal government which set up Indiana
voters to incur those costs, unilaterally mandating voters who lack a
government-issued photo ID to incur an expense in order to vote.237 To
argue after the fact that the state played no role because the costs of such
documents are outside of its control seems incredulous. 238
The second court to consider the issue, Common Cause II, also held
that secondary costs do not constitute a poll tax.239 However, rather than
critically analyzing the effect of secondary costs on the right to vote, the
court’s opinion seems influenced more by a desire to encourage the
good-faith efforts of the Georgia legislature to revise its voter ID law to
comply with the court’s previous Common Cause I ruling, in regards to
primary costs.240 Regardless of motive, the holding in Common Cause II
seems more justified than the Rokita decision given the different primary
document required by Georgia’s statute.241 Specifically, unlike Indiana’s
voter ID statute, Georgia’s law did not exclusively mandate a certified
government document to verify identity, permitting voter ID applicants
to show multiple forms of ID and theoretically allowing them to avoid
secondary documentation costs.242 Thus, unlike the Rokita court which
claimed that secondary monetary costs were only speculatively incurred

Id.
Id.
239
See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
240
Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 439 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1354 (N.D. Ga. 2006). For
instance, following Common Cause I’s injunction against the 2005 version of the law on
grounds that Georgia’s voter ID law likely violated Equal Protection and imposed an
unconstitutional poll tax, the Georgia legislature acted quickly to amend the law, dropping
the $20 fee and poverty affidavit requirements from the law, two elements of the 2005 law
which were especially disfavored by the Common Cause I court. Id. The Common Cause II
court, while claiming that the legislature had still not come far enough to bring the law into
compliance with the constitution, based on Equal Protection grounds, was quick to
encourage the legislature’s efforts to avoid imposing a poll tax as “admirable.” Id. at 1351.
241
See GA. ANN. STAT. § 21-2-417.1(e)(1) (2006) (listing other acceptable documents to
prove identity).
242
Common Cause II, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 1355; see also GA. ANN. STAT. § 21-2-417.1(e)(1)
(2006) (listing other acceptable documents to prove identity). However, as Georgia adopts
the requirements of the Real ID Act of 2005, the overlap of federal and state laws will
absolutely require certified government identification to obtain a government-issued ID,
placing the Common Cause II conclusion on much shakier grounds. See supra notes 130-32
and accompanying text. See also infra notes 244-47 (analyzing the Weinschenk court’s
reasoning).
237
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due to a lack of evidence, the Common Cause II court argued the same on
much firmer statutory grounds.243
Potentially altering the direction of analysis on this issue, the unique
reasoning in Weinschenk may prove most influential in cases considering
whether the secondary documentation costs impose impermissible costs
on the right to vote.244 Using the statutory overlap of Missouri’s voter ID
law and the federal REAL ID Act of 2005 as justification for its holding
and relying on affidavits of registered voters actually incurring
documentation costs, the Weinschenk court concluded that the secondary
documentation costs, necessary to obtain a voter ID card, did impose an
impermissible cost on the right to vote.245 The REAL ID Act mandates
that every person must prove U.S. citizenship by showing either a
certified birth certificate or U.S. passport before obtaining a governmentissued photo ID.246 The Weinschenk court astutely noted that when this
federal requirement is read in conjunction with the overlapping
requirement of Missouri’s voter ID law, mandating the use of a
government-issued photo ID to vote, any voter lacking a state-issued
photo ID and a certified document to prove identity must unavoidably
incur a cost in order to vote.247
Under the Weinschenk reasoning, even if a state voter ID law includes
a broader list of identifying documents, due to the statutory overlap with
the REAL ID Act, the state is federally mandated to require either a birth

Common Cause II, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 1355. What is unnecessary and potentially
confusing in the Common Cause II opinion, however, is the adoption of language from the
Rokita decision, characterizing the potential for voters to incur secondary costs as
“speculative.” Id. Whereas Rokita’s “speculative” language is based on the lack of voter
affidavits to support the plaintiffs’ claim, the Common Cause II court’s characterization of
“speculative” harm is based on distinct statutory requirements in the Georgia voter ID law.
See supra notes 241-42. The danger in Common Cause II’s use of language similar to that
used in Rokita is that future courts may not consider the fundamentally different reasoning
between the two decisions, mistakenly concluding that incurring secondary costs is always
speculative.
244
Although the Weinschenk court considered the issue of secondary costs under the state
Equal Protection clause, the court’s reasoning is applicable to the federal poll tax issue,
given the use of comparable language and reasoning by the court. Weinschenk v. Mo., 203
S.W.3d 201, 210-19 (Mo. 2006). Using language of both Equal Protection and poll tax
analysis, the Weinschenk court held that secondary costs impermissibly imposed a direct
cost and unduly burdened the right to vote. Id. at 214.
245
Id. at 207-08, 219.
246
Id. at 208 (citing Pub. L. No. 109-13., tit. II).
247
Id. at 207-08, 210-19. It appears that this reasoning is applicable to all states where this
statutory overlap exists, potentially impacting future cases considering the issue of
secondary costs imposing a poll tax.
243
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certificate or U.S. passport before issuing a voter ID.248 Thus, in cases
like Common Cause II which held that the broad list of documents
accepted to obtain a Georgia voter ID made incurring secondary costs
potentially avoidable, the statutory overlap with the REAL ID Act would
eliminate this possibility.249
In sum, state voter ID laws may impose impermissible material
requirements on the right to vote in two ways.250 Voter ID laws impose
primary costs on the right to vote through direct fees to obtain an ID or
through poverty affidavit exceptions, which require voters to attest to
indigency and take extra steps to vote.251 Additionally, although the law
in this area is still developing, voter ID laws may also impose secondary
costs on the right to vote by requiring voters to incur documentation
costs to obtain a voter ID.252
IV. CONTRIBUTION
This Note attempts to analyze how the law is developing in order to
draw thoughtful conclusions as to where rapidly-developing state voterID law is headed, rather than haphazardly attempting to direct its
development. Reflecting on this analysis, Part IV constructs a blueprint
for bringing successful Equal Protection and poll tax challenges against
state voter ID laws, synthesizing trends gleaned from successful claims
and cases decided thus far.253 Following the presentation of a blueprint,
or checklist, of steps to take to advance successful challenges to state
voter ID laws, Part IV provides additional subsections which further
emphasize and explain the importance of taking each step in light of the
initial cases decided, and which provide methods for pursuing each step
in greater detail.
Id.
See supra note 213 and accompanying text. However, regardless of the potential
statutory overlap, without affidavits of actual voters lacking a government-issued photo ID
and a requisite birth certificate, the Rokita court would likely fall back on its primary
argument that the harm is “speculative.” Even with affidavits, the Rokita court would
likely attempt to shift the burden for such costs onto the federal government again. See
Indiana Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 827 (S.D. Ind. 2006) (claiming that
such costs may be out of the state’s control).
250
See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
251
See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
252
See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
253
Part IV will not attempt to suggest a particular framework for judicial analysis, given
the law is too quickly changing and would quickly render such guesses moot. Nor will
Part IV attempt to propose alternatives and safeguards to voter ID laws, as these concepts
are currently being explored in contemporary scholarship. See generally Spencer Overton,
Voter Identification, 105 MICH. L. REV. 631 (2007).
248
249
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In order to advance successful Equal Protection and poll tax claims
against state voter ID laws, litigators would be prudent to take the
following steps:
A. Bringing a Successful Equal Protection Claim against a
State Voter ID Law
1. Advocate that the court adopt the use of strict
scrutiny analysis either outright or under the
Burdick test by persuading the court that the law
imposes severe harm.
a. Emphasize that the right to vote is
fundamental.
b. Effectively utilize sufficient and reliable
evidence to prove voter disenfranchisement
through voter affidavits and statistical
reports.
c. Stress the significant burdens that the
law imposes on the right to vote.
2. Successfully advocate under strict scrutiny
analysis that the law is not narrowly tailored to
advance a compelling government interest by
emphasizing that the law does not rationally prevent
or reduce existing voter fraud in the state.
B. Bringing a Successful Poll Tax Claim against a State
Voter ID Law
1. Argue that the law imposes primary costs on the
right to vote through fee and poverty affidavit
requirements.
2. Argue that the law imposes secondary costs on
the right to vote by directly or indirectly forcing
voters to incur documentation expenses.
A. Bringing a Successful Equal Protection Claim against a State Voter ID Law
Part IV.A states the necessary steps to bringing a successful Equal
Protection challenge against state voter ID laws, demonstrating why the
steps are important in light of the case law and explaining how to apply
each step in terms of general litigation strategy.
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Advocating the Use of Strict Scrutiny Analysis

Two methods have been used to analyze whether a state voter ID
law imposes an undue burden on the right to vote.254 A voter ID law
analyzed under strict scrutiny will likely be struck down as not being
narrowly-tailored.255 In contrast, a court’s decision to use rational basis
analysis under the Burdick test will likely prove fatal to claims against a
voter ID statute.256 Plaintiffs must persuade the court that strict scrutiny
is warranted, either outright or under the Burdick test, to improve the
potential success of their Equal Protection claim.257 To do so, it is
essential that plaintiffs prove that the harm imposed by a voter ID law is
severe.258 Based on current precedent, proving that severe harm is done
by emphasizing the right to vote as fundamental, effectively utilizing
sufficient and reliable evidence of voter disenfranchisement, and
simultaneously stressing the cumulative burdens imposed on the right to
vote by state voter ID laws.
a.

Characterizing the Harm as Severe: Emphasizing the Right To Vote As
Fundamental

Although definitive correlations are somewhat difficult to make
from the few cases thus far decided, courts which have expansively
characterized the right to vote as fundamental and have emphasized the
state’s regulatory authority as limited have chosen strict scrutiny
analysis.259 Alternatively, the only court to use rational basis review
under the Burdick test only cursorily noted the right to vote as
fundamental and provided a more expansive discussion of the power of
the state to regulate the administration of that right.260 Thus, plaintiffs
challenging a voter ID law under Equal Protection should vigorously
emphasize the right to vote as fundamental. In doing so, plaintiffs
should argue that the right to vote is one of the most important rights,
forming the basis for protecting all other rights in a democratic society.261
Likewise, plaintiffs should emphasize that the state’s regulatory power is
See supra notes 32-38.
See Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1361-62 (N.D. Ga. 2005)
(using strict scrutiny under the Burdick test); Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 439 F.
Supp. 2d 1294, 1349-50 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (using strict scrutiny under the Burdick test);
Weinschenk v. Missouri, 203 S.W.3d 201, 215-16 (Mo. 2006) (using strict scrutiny outright).
256
See, e.g., Indiana Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 826 (S.D. Ind. 2005).
257
See generally supra notes 161-72 and accompanying text.
258
See generally supra notes 161-72 and accompanying text.
259
See generally supra notes 161-72 and accompanying text.
260
Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 820-30.
261
See generally supra notes 161-72 and accompanying text.
254
255
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limited by constitutional provisions, such as the provision against
unduly burdening the fundamental right to vote.262 Plaintiffs should
similarly underscore that the fundamental right to vote is of particular
importance to the politically and economically vulnerable, emphasizing
that such voters have few alternative avenues to gain influence in
today’s aristocratic democracy.263
b.

Characterizing the Harm as Severe: Utilizing Evidence to Prove
Disenfranchisement

Next, arguably the most important factor for characterizing the harm
as severe is the sufficiency and reliability of evidence submitted to prove
voter disenfranchisement.264 The types of evidence most influential in a
court’s decision are affidavits of registered voters prohibited or
dissuaded from voting, and statistical evidence predicting the extent of
potential disenfranchisement.265 Voter affidavits are necessary to prove
actual harm to individual voters and are critical to the success of every
claim.266 Without affidavits of voters actually incurring the harm
alleged, courts are given the freedom to not provide clear judicial
reasoning, arguing instead that the harm is “speculative” or more
audaciously arguing that the lack of evidence represents a voter ID law’s
narrow tailoring to prevent disenfranchisement.267 Thus, to bolster every
claim, especially claims involving voter disenfranchisement, plaintiffs
should identify numerous voters who will actually incur the harm
alleged.268
Similarly, as important as the use of voter affidavits, plaintiffs’
efficacious use of statistical evidence is necessary to establish proof of
severe harm.269 Such reports are essential for estimating the scope of
potential disenfranchisement that a state voter ID law will have on
vulnerable classes of voters.270 The most common method used to
estimate disenfranchisement is the use of data comparisons between the
number of residents or registered voters in the state the number of
residents without state-issued photo identification.271
However,
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
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statistical reports prepared using this method alone may be insufficient
to ensure a court’s adoption of the report in its subsequent analysis.272
Plaintiffs preparing such reports should be careful to ensure that the
methods employed for creating them comport with the requirements of
Federal Rule of Evidence 702.273 Additionally, the source and motive for
the creation of statistical reports may be influential in the court’s decision
to accept the report as reliable evidence.274 For instance, statistical
reports created by government officials and made pursuant to official
duty or legislation may be considered more dependable than reports
made by statistical experts in preparation of trial.275 However, since the
ready existence of reports made by government officials is out of the
plaintiffs’ control, plaintiffs submitting their own reports should focus
on using reliable methods to ensure scientific reliability.276
c.

Characterizing the Harm as Severe: Stressing the Burdens on the Right to
Vote

Finally, important for characterizing the harm as severe and
influential in the court’s decision to use strict scrutiny analysis is the use
of the record as a whole to show that the right to vote is substantially
burdened by the requirements of a state voter ID law.277 Effectively
stressing the cumulative burdens is accomplished by highlighting every
roadblock imposed by the requirements of a voter ID law, which makes
the process of voting significantly more difficult.278 Such roadblocks
include: (1) difficulty obtaining an ID due to lack of transportation,
distantly located licensing offices, or inconvenient hours of operation; (2)
significant time and transportation costs to obtain requisite
documentation; (3) inadequate voter education of a law’s newly-imposed
requirements; (4) insufficient time to comply with a law before an
approaching election; or (5) inappropriate alternatives to a law’s strict ID

See generally supra notes 182-91 and accompanying text.
Id. FRE 702 sets the admissibility standards for expert testimony used to assist the
trier of fact to determine a fact in issue. See Indiana Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F.
Supp. 2d 775, 803-09 (S.D. Ind. 2006) (discussing the faults of the Brace Report). These
standards require that: (1) the testimony is based on upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied
the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. Id.
274
See generally supra notes 187-88 and accompanying text.
275
See generally supra notes 187-88 and accompanying text.
276
See generally supra notes 187-88 and accompanying text.
277
See supra notes 192-93 and accompanying text.
278
See supra notes 192-93 and accompanying text.
272
273
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requirement, such as unrealistic provisional ballots and highly
sophisticated absentee ballots.279
In sum, successfully characterizing the harm as severe is essential to
a court’s decision to use strict scrutiny analysis and to the likely success
of an Equal Protection claim. Thus, to prove severe harm, plaintiffs
should be sure to emphasize the right to vote as fundamental, effectively
utilize sufficient and reliable evidence of voter disenfranchisement, and
simultaneously stress the cumulative burdens imposed on the right to
vote by state voter ID laws.
2.

Advocating Under Strict Scrutiny Analysis

Regardless of a state’s ability to produce actual evidence of in-person
voter fraud, most courts will likely hold that a state’s interest in
preventing voter fraud is compelling.280 Thus, once a court has elected to
use strict scrutiny analysis, plaintiffs must argue that the stringent photo
ID requirement of a state voter ID law is not narrowly tailored to serve
the government’s interest.281 The best chance for success is to argue that
the strict requirement of a state voter ID law, as applied, is counterintuitive to the proffered legislative purpose of combating voter fraud.282
In doing so, plaintiffs should emphasize the lack of evidence of in-person
fraud in the state and, whenever applicable, plaintiffs should point out
that the law ignores or makes easier areas of voting where actual fraud
has been proven, such as absentee voting and voter registration.283
Additionally, plaintiffs should argue that narrow tailoring requires state
legislatures to use the least drastic means and choose the least restrictive
alternatives when enacting laws that impact a fundamental right.284
Subsequently, plaintiffs should argue that the lack of evidence of inperson voting fraud is proof that the previous identification
requirements were effective to prevent fraud and were less restrictive
than the state’s voter ID law.285
In sum, plaintiffs bringing claims against voter ID laws under Equal
Protection must convince a court that strict scrutiny analysis is
279
See supra notes 192-93 and accompanying text (evidence of such factors should also be
sufficiently backed up with affidavits of individual voters actually incurring the alleged
harm).
280
See generally supra notes 197-98 and accompanying text.
281
See generally supra notes 199-202 and accompanying text.
282
See generally supra notes 199-202 and accompanying text.
283
See generally supra notes 199-202 and accompanying text.
284
See generally supra notes 199-202 and accompanying text.
285
See generally supra notes 199-202 and accompanying text.
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warranted, given the severe harm imposed by the law. Severe harm is
shown through voter affidavits, statistical reports, and evidence
highlighting the increased difficulty in the ability to vote as a result of
the requirements of a state voter ID law. Once strict scrutiny is adopted,
either outright or under the Burdick test, plaintiffs must show through
common-sense presentation of the evidence that the law’s requirement is
not narrowly tailored to the state’s goal of preventing fraud.
B. Bringing a Successful Poll Tax Claim Against a State Voter ID Law
Part IV.B explains the necessary steps for bringing a successful poll
tax challenge against state voter ID laws, explaining why the steps are
important in light of the case law and how to apply each step in terms of
general litigation strategy. The claim that state voter ID laws impose
unconstitutional costs on the right to vote can be brought under two
theories. The first theory is that voter ID laws impose primary costs by
mandating a fee or by requiring an indigent voter to sign a poverty
affidavit. The second theory is that voter ID laws impose secondary costs
by indirectly requiring voters to spend time and money acquiring
documentation.
1.

State Voter ID Laws Impose Primary Costs through Fee and Poverty
Affidavit Requirements

State voter ID laws which impose a mandatory fee to obtain a voter
ID will likely be struck down easily, given that such requirements more
clearly violate the express constitutional prohibition against poll taxes.286
This is true regardless of whether the state attempts to argue that the cost
is a necessary fee to cover administrative costs.287 Given the obvious
constitutional violation, no states have since included a mandatory fee in
subsequent voter ID laws and will likely not include them in the future.
Thus, the more likely claim is that poverty affidavit requirements,
requiring voters to sign an affidavit attesting to indigency before voting
without an ID, impose primary costs on the right to vote.288 Under this
claim, plaintiffs should argue that such requirements are material and
will have a chilling effect on voting, causing many to forgo voting rather
than face potential embarrassment or risk perjuring themselves by
signing a poverty affidavit.289 Similarly, plaintiffs should also argue that
poverty affidavit requirements, which necessitate additional steps to
286
287
288
289
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vote (such as a return trip to a registrar’s office following an election)
will also have a chilling effect on voting due to the added costs of time
and travel.290
2.

State Voter ID Laws
Documentation Expenses

Impose

Secondary

Costs

through

Claiming that the secondary costs imposed by voter ID statutes
constitute a poll tax consistently fails in federal court.291 However, such
claims may still prove successful in the future, especially when
supported by voter affidavits and when understood in light of the
statutory overlap with the REAL ID Act of 2005.292 In response to the
argument that voter ID statutes impermissibly impose secondary costs
on the right to vote, most judges have argued that voters may not be
forced to actually incur such costs.293 The primary method for justifying
their reasoning in this regard is to note the lack of affidavits identifying
voters who have actually incurred or will incur documentation costs in
order to obtain a voter ID.294 Thus, as with all claims, plaintiffs should
present affidavits of voters actually forced to incur a monetary expense
to acquire a birth certificate or other required government document in
the process of obtaining a voter ID card.295
Another judicial response to the argument that voter ID statutes
impose secondary costs on the right to vote is to argue that
documentation costs are avoidable due to a voter ID statute’s flexible list
of identifying documents used to obtain a voter ID.296 In this situation,
the court argues that a state voter ID law does not impose secondary
costs because the law does not exclusively mandate a birth certificate or
passport to verify identity for the purposes of obtaining an ID.297
However, in states where the federal REAL ID Act of 2005 has taken
effect, plaintiffs should argue that the statutory overlap between the
federal and state requirements imposes secondary documentation costs
on the right to vote.298 Building on the reasoning of the Weinschenk court
and documenting the monetary costs necessary to acquire a birth

290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
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certificate and requisite for obtaining a state voter ID should prove
convincing on this claim.299
In sum, plaintiffs bringing poll tax claims against voter ID statutes
can argue that such laws impose both primary and secondary costs on
the right to vote. Plaintiffs arguing primary costs should attack any
mandatory fees or poverty affidavit requirements imposed by a voter ID
law, pointing out clear constitutional violations and the chilling effect
that such requirements will have on voting. Similarly, plaintiffs arguing
secondary costs should present voter affidavits of actual voters incurring
monetary expenses to acquire the requisite identifying documents to
obtain a voter ID; they should emphasize that the statutory overlap
between the federal REAL ID Act and the state voter ID law mandates
the states to require a more limited, and ultimately more costly, list of
identifying documents to issue a voter ID.
V. CONCLUSION
Given the high number of voters potentially disenfranchised by
extra-stringent voter ID laws and the disproportionate impact that such
laws may have on particularly vulnerable classes of voters, it is
imperative that such laws do not take effect as proposed. Because the
right to vote is often the only way for the socially and economically
vulnerable in society to preserve their rights, the loss of the right is
particularly detrimental.
Thus, regardless of the illicit political
motivations for and against enacting state voter ID laws, it is crucial that
future legal challenges prove successful. Ideally, this Note will serve as a
useful tool for litigators presently bringing claims against state voter ID
laws and will lay the foundation for a more comprehensive legal analysis
in the future.
Exploring the factual background and subsequent judicial treatment
of three similarly enacted voter ID statutes, this Note deduces factors
which contribute to successful claims against these laws. Building on
conclusions from this analysis, this Note constructs a blueprint for
bringing successful Equal Protection and poll tax claims against similarly
enacted laws in the future. Given the prevalent enactment of state voter
ID laws and the gravity of potential harm imposed by them, effective
utilization of the factors set forth in this Note may prove influential in
preserving the fundamental right to vote for millions of Americans in the
future.
299

See generally supra notes 182-83 and accompanying text.
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VI. AFTERWORD
While anticipating publication of this Note, rapid developments took
place during the Summer of 2007. On June 11, 2007, the Georgia
Supreme Court vacated the Fulton County Superior Court decision in
Perdue v. Lake, concluding that the plaintiff lacked standing to challenge
the Georgia voter ID statute.300 Two weeks later, the Federal Court of the
Northern District of Georgia lifted the stay of proceedings in the federal
case and set trial on the merits.301 On Sept. 6, 2007, mimicking the
approach and frequently citing the Rokita opinion, district court Judge J.
Murphy declined to issue a further injunction against the Georgia voter
ID law.302 Throwing out the testimony of the plaintiffs’ experts
regarding voter disenfranchisement, the court adopted the language and
reasoning of Rokita stating, “[p]laintiffs have failed to produce any
evidence of any individual . . . who would undergo any appreciable
hardship to obtain photo identification in order to be qualified to
vote.”303 The court further adopted the language and reasoning of
Purcell v. Gonzalez, arguing that the state had a compelling interest in
preventing perceived voter fraud and that the law should be upheld
under rational basis analysis.304 Although the court’s merits discussion
is arguably dicta, given the court’s prior determination regarding

300
Perdue v. Lake, 647 S.E.2d 6 (Ga. 2007); see also Common Cause v. Billups, 2007 WL
2601438 *5 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (“Common Cause III”).
301
See Common Cause v. Billups, 2007 WL 2601438, *5 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (“Common Cause
III”).
302
Id.
303
Id. at *37-38, *47 (quoting Indiana Dem. Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 821-23
(S.D. Ind. 2006).
304
Id. at *47-48 (quoting Purcell v. Gonzalez, 127 S. Ct. 5, 7 (2006)) (“a state indisputably
has a compelling interest in preserving the integrity of its election process.”. . .”[v]oters
who fear their legitimate votes will be outweighed by fraudulent ones will feel
disenfranchised.”) (emphasis added); see also Linda Greenhouse, Justices Agree to Hear Case
Challenging Voter ID Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2007, at A24 [hereinafter “Greenhouse”]
(noting the shift in judicial reasoning that preventing perception of voter fraud is a sufficient
state interest to overcome the risk of actual disenfranchisement).
Directly controverting its previous analysis, the Common Cause III court went on to
argue that Georgia’s voter ID law was “rationally related” to the state’s compelling interest
in preventing fraud. Common Cause III, 2007 WL 2601438, *48 n.9 (“In a previous Order, the
Court speculated that the Photo ID requirement probably was not even rationally related to
the asserted justification of preventing voting fraud. That speculation, however, is not
binding on the Court and, frankly, proved to be inaccurate.”); see also Greenhouse, supra note
304 (suggesting J. Murphy’s reliance on Justice Posner’s analysis in reversing his own legal
analysis from that of the previous Common Cause decisions). Further adopting the language
of Rokita, the court stated, “the legislature has wide latitude in determining the problems it
wishes to address and the manner in which it desires to address them.” Id. at *48 (quoting
Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 829).
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standing,305 the court’s dramatic change of course from its previous
opinions and strong reliance on Rokita highlights judicial confusion
regarding how to approach constitutional challenges to state voter ID
laws.306 It also underscores the critical importance of submitting strong
evidentiary support of voter disenfranchisement in order to encourage
courts to strike down the laws under strict scrutiny analysis.
On September 25, 2007, the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Indiana Democratic Party v. Rokita to decide the issues therein
in early 2008.307 While it is impossible to predict with certainty the
outcome of the Court’s decision, the author predicts that the Court will
likely adopt much of the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning and uphold the
Indiana voter ID law under Burdick-rational basis review. First, the
Court’s selection of Rokita to discuss constitutional challenges to voter ID
laws presents a relatively easy case for the Court if it wishes to uphold
Indiana’s law, due to the “weak” evidentiary record of voter
disenfranchisement presented in that case.308 Indeed, this Note has
attempted to caution future litigators of the evidentiary pitfalls plaguing
constitutional challenges to voter ID laws, using the Rokita case as an
example of what not to do. Second, the timing of the Court’s hearing and
decision, shortly before the 2008 presidential election, suggests the likely
outcome of the Court’s decision. In Purcell v. Gonzalez, the Court rapidly
See id. at *41. Accordingly, this Note’s discussion regarding the previous Common
Cause rulings remains useful. The reader is cautioned, however, to note the court’s change
in approach toward the evidence submitted by the plaintiffs to prove voter
disenfranchisement, pursuant to the bench trial in Common Cause III. See generally Common
Cause III, 2007 WL 2601438, *37-49.
306
See Common Cause III at *46-47 (The court goes to great lengths in its attempt to
distinguish its analysis from it previous opinions in which the court granted two
preliminary injunctions against the Georgia voter ID law, claiming that the evidentiary
standards are more strict at the trial stage and highlighting the state’s efforts to educate
voters regarding the new requirement). See also Legal Challenges to New Voter-ID Laws
Should be Resolved Before Next Round of National Elections to Avoid Chaos, GRAND RAPIDS
PRESS, Oct. 7, 2007, at A14 (arguing that Supreme Court resolution of the issue is necessary
to avoid confusion in the 2008 presidential election); Reasonable Voter ID Laws, WASH.
TIMES, Oct. 2, 2007, at A16.
307
See 2007 WL 1999963; 2007 WL 1999941; see also Greenhouse, supra note 304. The
appeal consolidated Indiana Dem. Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775 (S.D. Ind. 2006), and
Crawford v. Marion Co. Elec. Bd., 2007 WL 16194 (7th Cir. 2007). Id.
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A strong record of voter disenfranchisement has proved critical for the adoption of
strict scrutiny analysis in all of the cases decided thus far. Indeed, the constitutional
challenges made against the Georgia and Missouri laws had more sufficiently developed
evidentiary records, presented stronger arguments for adopting strict scrutiny either
outright or under Burdick analysis, and would likely have made for a more robust
discussion on the merits by the Supreme Court had the Court chosen to hear or consolidate
its 2008 Rokita hearing with one of those cases.
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intervened to reinstate Arizona’s voter ID law, cautioning that removing
the state voter ID law so close to the 2006 primary elections would likely
cause more disenfranchisement than the law itself.309 With nearly half of
the states currently employing voter ID requirements in one form or
another, common sense and the Court’s past jurisprudence suggests that
the Court is highly unlikely to call into doubt numerous laws so close to
a major election.
Third, and most unfortunate, the ideological makeup of the Court
may play a significant role in determining the outcome. As with all state
voter ID laws, the Indiana law passed along strict party lines.310 The
legislative split highlights a partisan divide and suggests that the real
controversy over state voter ID laws concerns political power and not the
prevention of voter fraud nor the protection of the rights of society’s
most politically vulnerable. Similarly, the Seventh Circuit Rokita court
was divided along political appointment lines in both decisions to grant
appeal from the District Court and to uphold the law.311 In an era of
increasing partisanship, although lamentable, it would be overlyidealistic to avoid taking the ideological composition of the Court into
account when predicting outcome.312 Recognizing the harm caused
when the rights of society’s most politically vulnerable become a
“political football” for any political party, however, the author hopes
that the Court’s decision in Rokita—regardless of outcome—will expose
the underlying partisan motives for and against state voter ID laws, will

Purcell v. Gonzalez, 127 S. Ct. 5 (2006).
See generally supra Part II.
311
See Adam Liptak, Fear but Few Facts In Debate on Voter IDs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2007,
at A12; Voter ID, BUCKS CO. COURIER TIMES, Oct. 3, 2007, at A10 (quoting the Seventh
Circuit dissenting opinion, “[t]he Indiana voter photo ID law is a not-too-thinly-veiled
attempt to discourage election-day turnout by certain folks believed to skew Democratic.”).
312
See, e.g., The Roberts Court Returns, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2007.
The Supreme Court begins its new term as bitterly divided as it has
ever been. There are three hardened camps: four very conservative
justices, four liberals, and a moderate conservative, Justice Anthony
Kennedy, hovering in between. The division into rigid blocs is
unfortunate, because it makes the court seem more like a political body
than a legal one. . . . Today, the justices seem just as political, wrapping
their views on controversial social issues in neutral-sounding legal
doctrines. The case that will most test the court’s ability to rise above
partisanship is a challenge to Indiana’s voter ID law. . . . If the justices
act as umpires and call balls and strikes, this term could produce some
real victories in voting rights . . . It could result in some terrible
setbacks . . . however, if . . . the court is calling balls and strikes but
has moved the strike zone far to the right.”
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rise above any real and perceived ideological divides within its own
ranks, and will blindly balance the competing interests.
If the Court does uphold Indiana’s voter ID law as predicted, the
author encourages future litigators to consider the potential for a narrow
interpretation of the Court’s decision. In particular, if the Court justifies
the use of rational basis due to the weak evidentiary record of voter
disenfranchisement, the Rokita decision may be distinguishable in future
constitutional challenges to voter ID laws. In particular, litigators would
be well-advised to assemble more sufficiently developed evidentiary
records of disenfranchisement in order to advocate for more stringent
judicial analysis in future challenges. In such cases, the author hopes
that this Note will remain a useful tool for understanding the evidentiary
pitfalls plaguing previous challenges and serve as a blueprint for
constructing stronger records and, thus, more effective constitutional
challenges in the future.
Kelly T. Brewer313
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Dedicated to all of those who “speak [] for those who cannot speak for
themselves, for the rights of all who are destitute.” Be encouraged; “[s]peak up
and judge fairly; defend the rights of the poor and needy.” Proverbs 31:8-9.
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